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Abstract
This thesis looks at the security of electronic commerce transaction process-
ing. It begins with an introduction to security terminology used in the thesis.
Security requirements for card payments via the Internet are then described,
as are possible protocols for electronic transaction processing. It appears that
currently the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol together with its standardised
version Transport Layer Security (TLS) are the most widely used means to se-
cure electronic transactions made over the Internet. Therefore, the analysis and
discussions presented in the remainder of the thesis are based on the assumption
that this protocol provides a ‘baseline’ level of security, against which any novel
means of security should be measured.
The SSL and TLS protocols are analysed with respect to how well they
satisfy the outlined security requirements. As SSL and TLS provide transport
layer security, and some of the security requirements are at the application
level, it is not surprising that they do not address all the identified security
requirements.
As a result, in this thesis, we propose four protocols that can be used to build
upon the security features provided by SSL/TLS. The main goal is to design
schemes that enhance the security of electronic transaction processing whilst
imposing minimal overheads on the involved parties. In each case, a description
of the new scheme is given, together with its advantages and limitations. In the
first protocol, we propose a way to use an EMV card to improve the security of
online transactions. The second protocol involves the use of the GSM subscriber
authentication service to provide user authentication over the Internet. Thirdly,
we propose the use of GSM data confidentiality service to protect sensitive
information as well as to ensure user authentication.
Regardless of the protection scheme employed for the transactions, there
exist threats to all PCs used to conduct electronic commerce transactions. These
residual threats are examined, and motivate the design of the fourth protocol,
proposed specifically to address cookie threats.
Abbreviations
3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project
AAC Application Authentication Cryptogram
AC Application Cryptogram
ACS Access Control Server
ARPC Authorisation Response Cryptogram
ARQC Authorisation Request Cryptogram
AuC Authentication Centre
B2C Business to Consumer
CA Certification Authority
CD Card Details
CGI Common Gateway Interface
CVC Card Verification Code
CVM Cardholder Verification Method
DAD Dynamic Application Data
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
E-Commerce Electronic Commerce
EMV Europay MasterCard Visa
IAC Internal Authenticate Command
IC card Integrated Circuit card
ID Identifier
IP Internet Protocol
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
HTML HyperText Markup Language
HTTPS Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol
MAC Message Authentication Code
ME Mobile Equipment
MN Mobile phone Number
MS Mobile Station
PAN Primary Account Number
PC Personal Computer
PD Payment Details
PI Purchase Information
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
POS Point of Sale
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SAD Static Application Data
SET Secure Electronic Transaction
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SPA Secure Payment Application
SPC Software Publisher Certificate
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
SMS Short Message Service
TC Transaction Certificate
TLS Transport Layer Security
UCAF Universal Cardholder Authentication Field
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
URL Uniform Resource Locator
U-SIM User Services Identity Module
WAP Wireless Application Protocol
Contents
1 Introduction 19
1.1 Motivation and challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.2 Main contributions of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3 Structure of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2 Security Definitions 25
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 Security services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2.1 Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2.2 Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2.3 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.4 Non-repudiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.5 Access control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Security mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.1 Asymmetric cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.2 Symmetric cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
I Overview of Electronic Commerce Transactions 33
3 Security Issues 34
CONTENTS
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 Security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.1 Issuers and acquirers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.2 Merchants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.3 Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Meeting the security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3.1 SSL and TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3.2 Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3.3 Visa 3-Domain Secure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.4 MasterCard Secure Payment Application . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4 SSL/TLS Analysis 45
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2 An overview of SSL and TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.1 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.2 Transport Layer Security (TLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.3 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3.1 Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3.2 Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3.3 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3.4 Non-repudiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3.5 Replay protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
11
CONTENTS
II Enhancing the Security of E-Commerce 59
5 EMV Cards in E-Commerce 60
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.2 An overview of EMV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.2.1 Card authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.2.2 Cardholder verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.2.3 Application cryptograms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.3 Using EMV cards for e-commerce transactions . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.3.1 System architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.3.2 Transaction processing procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.3.3 Security services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.4 Threat analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.4.1 Threats to the cardholder environment . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.4.2 Threats at the Merchant Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.5 Use of trusted card readers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.5.1 System architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.5.2 Transaction process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.5.3 Threat analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.6 Advantages and disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.7 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6 GSM and E-Commerce 91
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.2 An overview of GSM security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.2.1 Subscriber identity authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
12
CONTENTS
6.2.2 Data confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.3 Using GSM authentication for e-commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.3.1 System architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.3.2 Transaction processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.3.3 Threat analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.3.4 Advantages and disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.4 Using GSM data encryption for e-commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.4.1 System architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.4.2 Transaction processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.4.3 Threat analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.4.4 Advantages and disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.4.6 A comparison of the two proposed protocols . . . . . . . . 124
6.5 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.6 Extending the protocols to 3G/UMTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.6.1 3G/UMTS security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.6.2 Protocol extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7 The Remaining Threats 129
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.2 Active content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.2.1 Java applets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
7.2.2 ActiveX controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.2.3 Security implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
7.3 Web browser flaws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
13
CONTENTS
7.4 Cookies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.4.1 Monitoring user behaviour using cookies . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.4.2 Compromising confidentiality of cookie contents . . . . . 139
7.4.3 Malicious cookies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8 Enhancing the Security of Cookies 143
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8.2 Security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
8.2.1 Cookie confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
8.2.2 Cookie integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
8.2.3 Cookie authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
8.3 Meeting the security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
8.3.1 Browsers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
8.3.2 Secure channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
8.3.3 Access control for user PCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
8.3.4 Cryptographic protection within cookie files . . . . . . . . 150
8.3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
8.4 Server-managed cookie encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
8.5 User-managed cookie encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
8.5.1 Using symmetric cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
8.5.2 Using asymmetric cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
8.6 User-managed cookie protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
8.6.1 Cookie encryption using symmetric cryptography . . . . . 156
8.6.2 Cookie encryption using asymmetric cryptography . . . . 158
8.6.3 Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
8.6.4 Security services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
14
CONTENTS
8.7 Secure cookies vs. user-managed cookies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
8.7.1 User authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
8.7.2 Integrity and confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
8.7.3 Cookie authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
8.7.4 Other issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
8.7.5 Further development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
8.8 Summary and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
9 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 166
9.1 Summary and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
9.2 Directions for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Bibliography 172
15
List of Tables
4.1 Differences between SSL and TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2 Security services provided by SSL and TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8.1 Secure Cookie Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
8.2 Comparisons of server-managed and client-managed cookies . . . 164
List of Figures
3.1 Debit/credit card payment system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.1 EMV card process flowchart. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.2 Remote EMV system architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.3 Transaction flow for remote EMV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.4 Possible trusted card readers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.5 Transaction flow for remote EMV with secure card reader . . . . 86
6.1 System architecture — GSM-based cardholder authentication. . . 96
6.2 GSM-e-commerce identity authentication process. . . . . . . . . . 99
6.3 Revised protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.4 Another revised protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.5 GSM-e-commerce payment system architecture. . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.6 GSM-e-commerce payment protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.7 Revised protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
LIST OF FIGURES
8.1 Cookie encryption using symmetric cryptography. . . . . . . . . . 157
8.2 Cookie encryption using asymmetric cryptography. . . . . . . . . 159
18
Chapter 1
Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation and challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.2 Main contributions of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3 Structure of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The aim of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the research in this
thesis, including an outline of the motivation for the research and the major
challenges in the research area. The chapter also describes the main contribu-
tions of this thesis, and the overall structure.
1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation and challenges
According to the International Electrotechnical Consortium (IEC)1, ‘electronic
commerce (e-commerce) can be broadly defined as a model of selling and buying
in which buyers are able to participate in all phases of a purchase decision, while
stepping through those processes electronically rather than in a physical store.
The processes in electronic commerce include enabling a customer to access
product information, select items to purchase, pay for the items securely, and
have the payment settled financially.’
Today, the Internet has become the main medium for conducting electronic
commerce. Many products, tangible and intangible, are browsed through and
sold over the Internet. There are a number of possible payment methods, such
as electronic cash, electronic cheque, debit/credit card, and electronic wallets.
However, debit/credit cards are by far the most common payment method used
over the Internet.
As the scale of electronic commerce transactions has grown, it has become
very attractive to criminals, and the volume of fraudulent e-commerce transac-
tions is growing rapidly. Therefore, there has been an increase in the amount
of attention given to the security of the payment systems used to process online
transactions. Probably the main current concern of most Internet users relates
to the confidentiality of payment card information, since there is a growing
realisation that stolen card details can be used to make fraudulent transactions.
One may argue that card account information is often revealed in everyday
use, for example when one makes a card payment in petrol stations, supermar-
kets, restaurants or any other shop. However, what makes online payments
different from those performed at conventional retail outlets is that the lat-
ter have the advantage of face-to-face interactions and hand-written signatures,
1http://www.iec.org
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which act as countermeasures to card fraud.
It is clear that if data confidentiality is not ensured, it would be possible for
an adversary to obtain sensitive information such as card details and then use
them to make payments at the expense of the legitimate cardholder. However,
security requirements for online transactions are not limited to data confiden-
tiality, but also include other security services such as user authentication, non-
repudiation and data integrity. It is clear, for example, that online transactions
need to be shown to be authentic, i.e. they have not been modified in a way that
could enable fraud, and have originated from a legitimate user. Moreover, it
is important that once a transaction has been made, both merchant and client
cannot deny receiving or making a payment.
For the past few years, a number of solutions have been introduced to im-
prove online transaction processing security. Examples include First Virtual,
NetCash, and SET (Secure Electronic Transaction). However, Secure Socket
Layer (SSL), and its standardised version Transport Layer Security (TLS), re-
main by far the most widely used means for providing security services for
e-commerce transactions [23, 86], despite the fact that these protocols were
designed to provide security for communications links, and not for entire e-
commerce transactions.
Although SSL/TLS does eliminate some security risks such as eavesdropping
and unauthorised modification, it only protects information while it is being
transmitted. Therefore, there remain a number of risks and threats which can
lead to card fraud. As a result, there is a need for electronic payment protocols
which enhance the security of e-commerce transaction processing over and above
the level provided by SSL/TLS. The protocols also need to be sufficiently
lightweight, i.e. not posing too great an overhead on the participants, so that
there are not serious disincentives to their adoption.
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1.2 Main contributions of this thesis
This thesis looks at ways to enhance the security of electronic commerce trans-
action processing. The main contributions of this thesis are as follows.
• Security requirements for an Internet payment have been identified and
the currently available security protocols have been reviewed against these
requirements.
• A thorough analysis of the effectiveness of SSL/TLS in meeting the iden-
tified security requirements is given.
• Four novel protocols have been proposed to help meet the identified se-
curity requirements. The main characteristics of these four protocols are
now described.
In the first protocol, a way of using EMV IC cards for secure remote pay-
ments, such as those made in e-commerce, is proposed. The scheme only requires
users to possess an EMV-compliant debit/credit card and a smart card reader.
Threats to, and advantages and disadvantages of, the scheme are also examined.
A variation of the protocol to incorporate the use of a trusted card reader is also
discussed, and the impact of this modification on the overall level of security is
considered.
In the second protocol, user authentication is provided using GSM ‘sub-
scriber identity authentication’. A consumer is required to possess a GSM mo-
bile station with a subscriber name corresponding to that on his/her debit/credit
card. The cardholder identity is combined with the GSM subscriber identity
in such a way that without a mobile station, in particular the SIM, and the
corresponding debit/credit card, an unscrupulous user will find it difficult to
make a fraudulent payment at the expense of the legitimate cardholder. This is
achieved in such a way that no management overhead is imposed on the user.
22
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The third protocol, which also uses a GSM security service, is a payment pro-
tocol in which the risk of having debit/credit card details stored at a merchant
server is eliminated. User authentication is also provided. This is achieved by
using the GSM data confidentiality service to encrypt sensitive information as
well as to provide user identity authentication. Since the 3rd generation mobile
communications system is becoming a reality, variations of the GSM-based tech-
niques to allow use of a 3GPP U-SIM instead of a GSM SIM are also described
and evaluated.
Even when a protocol designed to secure an electronic commerce transaction
is used, there are certain remaining threats which are inherent when user PCs
are connected to the Internet. One major problem of this type arises from the
use of cookies. As a result, a fourth protocol is proposed specifically to deal with
threats arising from cookies. Two user-controlled cookie encryption schemes are
presented. The approaches are also compared with a server-controlled approach,
to illustrate their relative advantages and disadvantages.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
This thesis is divided into two main parts. Part I provides an overview of, and
background information regarding, e-commerce security. Part II describes and
analyses four protocols which have been proposed with the goal of enhancing
the security of e-commerce transactions.
Chapter 2 is a preliminary chapter containing the definitions of security
terminology used in the thesis.
Part I then consists of two chapters. In Chapter 3, the security requirements
necessary for electronic transaction processing are identified, followed by a re-
view of some of the main currently available security protocols. A review of
23
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the security services each protocol provides is subsequently given. Chapter 4
provides a thorough analysis of the SSL and TLS protocols in terms of how well
they meet the security requirements previously outlined.
Part II consists of five chapters. While Chapter 5 proposes a way in which
EMV cards can be used to enhance e-commerce security, Chapter 6 proposes
two payment protocols in which GSM subscriber identity authentication and
GSM data confidentiality are used to support e-commerce security services.
Chapter 7 examines general threats to a PC used to conduct electronic commerce
transactions. In Chapter 8, a novel approach to cookie encryption is described,
which addresses one of the major sources of threats identified in Chapter 7.
Finally, Chapter 9 discusses possible future research directions and concludes
the thesis.
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The aim of this preliminary chapter is to provide definitions of the security
terminology used in this thesis.
2. Security Definitions
2.1 Introduction
When designing a security protocol, it is important firstly to define its security
goals. These goals are generally referred to as security services. It is also
important to identify the mechanisms which can provide each security service.
In this chapter, therefore, we first define the security services of relevance to
this thesis (Section 2.2). In Section 2.3, security mechanisms which can be used
to provide the security services are then examined.
2.2 Security services
There are five main security services which are of importance in this thesis.
They are confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and access
control. The following definitions are based on those given in [22, 29, 50, 72, 81].
2.2.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality means that the assets of a computer system and transmitted
information and/or data are protected against access by unauthorised entities.
Possible methods of access include printing, displaying, and other forms of dis-
closure, including simply revealing the existence of the information. According
to Ford [22], ‘confidentiality services protect against information being disclosed
or revealed to entities not authorised to have that information.’
2.2.2 Integrity
Integrity means that the assets of a computer system and transmitted infor-
mation and/or data can be modified only by authorised parties and only in
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authorised ways. Data integrity services therefore are ‘safeguards against the
threat that the value or existence of data might be changed in a way inconsistent
with the recognized security policy’ [22]. Modification or changing the value of a
data item includes writing, changing, changing the status, deleting, substituting,
inserting, reordering, and delaying or replaying of transmitted messages [22, 72].
The Clark-Wilson model [10] defines integrity as those qualities which give
data and systems both internal consistency and a good correspondence to real-
world expectations for the systems and data. Controls are needed for both
internal consistency and external consistency.
2.2.3 Authentication
Authentication can be subdivided into origin authentication and entity authen-
tication.
According to [50], origin authentication provides corroboration to an entity
that the source of received message is as claimed. The data origin authentication
service provides the corroboration of the source of a data unit. However, the
service in itself does not provide protection against duplication or modification
of data units.
Entity authentication ensures that an identity presented by a remote party
participating in a communication connection or session is genuine [22]. It is ‘an
ability to verify an entity’s claimed identity, by another entity’ [28].
2.2.4 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation is the ability to prove that an action or event has taken place, so
that this event or action cannot be repudiated later [36]. In other words, the non-
repudiation service provides protection against one party to a communication
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exchange later falsely denying that the exchange occurred. Non-repudiation
of receipt or transmission provides the sender or the receiver respectively with
the means to establish that the message was indeed received or transmitted.
According to Ford [22], a non-repudiation service, in itself, does not eliminate
repudiation. He states that ‘it does not prevent any party from denying another
party’s claim that something occurred. What it does is ensure the availability of
irrefutable evidence to support the speedy resolution of any such disagreement.’
2.2.5 Access control
The goal of an access control service is to protect against unauthorised access
to any resource, for example a computing resource, communications resource,
or information resource [22]. Unauthorised access includes unauthorised use,
disclosure, modification, destruction, and issuing of commands. It requires that
access to the protected resources be controlled.
2.3 Security mechanisms
Security mechanisms are means to achieve the security services described above.
There is no single mechanism that can provide all the security services. How-
ever, there is one main class of techniques that underlies most of the security
mechanisms in use, namely cryptographic mechanisms [81].
In this section, we briefly describe each security mechanism of importance to
this thesis in terms of what they are, rather than the details of their operation.
Such details are outside the scope of the thesis and can be found in many
cryptography textbooks, see for example [22, 66, 83].
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2.3.1 Asymmetric cryptography
The concept of asymmetric cryptography, or public key cryptography, was first
introduced in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman [12]. An asymmetric cryptosystem
is a cryptographic scheme in which two distinct keys, known as the public key
and the private key, are used. The public key, as its name suggests, can be
made public to everyone in the communications system. On the other hand,
the private key must be kept secret, and known only to its legitimate owner.
Although confidentiality is not important for the public key since it must
be made accessible to anyone, it is important to ensure its integrity. To be
precise, it must not be possible to alter a person’s public key. The concept of
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has therefore been introduced as a means
to generate, distribute and manage ‘public key certificates’ which are used to
bind the identifier of a party to that party’s public key [22]. A widely adopted
standard for the format of digital certificates is X.509 [51].
There are a number of broad classes of asymmetric cryptographic scheme,
including encryption schemes, digital signature schemes, and key agreement
schemes. However, only the first two will be described here since they are most
relevant to this thesis.
2.3.1.1 Asymmetric encryption
Asymmetric encryption schemes use public keys for encryption and private keys
for decryption. The best known algorithm for public key encryption is RSA,
which was proposed in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [74]. Specifications
for public key encryption, including the use of RSA, can be found in [35], and
also in the emerging international standard [47]. Asymmetric encryption can
be used to provide data confidentiality.
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2.3.1.2 Digital signature
[50] defines a digital signature as ‘data appended to, or a cryptographic transfor-
mation of, a data unit, that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source
and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery’. In other words, as
stated in the introduction to [39], ‘digital signature mechanisms are asymmetric
cryptographic techniques which can be used to provide entity authentication,
data origin authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation services’.
A signature scheme consists of two components, namely a signing algorithm
and a verification algorithm. The signing algorithm involves the transformation
of the message into a signature, using the signing entity’s private key. It should
be clear that, for a digital signature scheme to work, there is a need for a
verification process, so that it is possible to verify whether a signature on a
message was genuinely created by the claimed entity. This verification process
takes as input the signature, the message, and the signer’s public verification
key, and outputs an indication as to whether or not the signature on the message
is valid.
Many digital signature schemes have been proposed over the last 25 years
(see, for example, [66]). For digital signature standards, see for example [20, 39,
40]. Digital signature schemes can be used to provide data origin authentication,
data integrity, and non-repudiation.
2.3.2 Symmetric cryptography
Symmetric cryptography is a cryptographic scheme in which either the same
key (secret key) or two keys that can be easily computed from each other are
used [66]. That is, in a symmetric cryptographic scheme, the communicating
parties are required to share a key which must be kept secret.
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There are a number of symmetric cryptographic schemes, including encryp-
tion schemes, message authentication codes, and cryptographic hash functions.
2.3.2.1 Symmetric encryption
Unlike asymmetric encryption, symmetric encryption uses a single key for both
the encryption and decryption transformation [46]. According to Menezes et
al. [66], the encryption is said to be symmetric if, for each associated encryp-
tion/decryption key pair, it is computationally ‘easy’ to determine a decryption
key knowing only the encryption key and vice versa.
There are two commonly used types of symmetric encryption scheme, namely
stream ciphers and block ciphers. A block cipher is an encryption scheme which
breaks up the plaintext messages to be transmitted into strings (called blocks)
of a fixed length and encrypts one block at a time [66]. On the other hand, a
stream cipher is ‘an encryption mechanism such that using a running key or a
fresh one-time-pad key stream, an encryption encrypts a plaintext in bit-wise or
block-wise manner’ [49]. For block cipher and stream cipher standards see, for
example, [49, 48]. As for asymmetric encryption, symmetric encryption schemes
can be used to provide data confidentiality.
2.3.2.2 Message authentication codes
The second type of symmetric cryptographic technique we describe is the Mes-
sage Authentication Code (MAC). This mechanism can be used to provide data
origin authentication and data integrity services. The originator of data inputs
the data to be protected into a MAC function, together with a secret key — the
resulting output (a short fixed-length bit string) is known as the MAC. This
MAC can then be sent or stored with the data being protected. The verifier
of the MAC simply uses the same secret key to recompute a MAC value on
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the data, and the data is accepted as valid if and only if the recomputed MAC
agrees with the value sent or stored with the data.
There are a number of widely used methods for computing MACs; see for
example [66]. Many of them are based on either block ciphers or cryptographic
hash functions. There are also standards for MAC computations, notably [41,
45].
2.3.2.3 Cryptographic hash function
Hash functions take a message as input and produce an output referred to as a
hash-code, hash-result, hash-value, message digest, or just hash. More formally,
‘a hash function is a function which maps strings of bits to fixed-length strings
of bits’ [42, 66]. It must also satisfy the following three properties.
• it must be computationally infeasible to find for a given output, an input
which maps to this output, and
• it must be computationally infeasible to find for a given input, a second
input which maps to the same output.
• it must be computationally infeasible to find two different inputs which
map to the same output.
Hash-functions form a vitally important part of almost all commonly used
digital signature schemes. There are a number of types of hash functions, for
example those based on block ciphers, those based on modular arithmetic, and
dedicated hash functions. For cryptographic hash function standards, see for
example [42, 43, 37, 38].
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3. Security Issues
The aim of this chapter is to outline security requirements (Section 3.2) for
electronic payment transactions, in order to provide the design motivation for
the protocols proposed in the following chapters.
In Section 3.3, a number of currently available protocols are described, fol-
lowed by a review of the security services they provide.
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3.1 Introduction
Electronic commerce is growing in significance. Many products, tangible and
intangible, are sold over the Internet, with payments typically made by debit
or credit cards. In parallel with this, there is an increase in concerns associated
with the security of the payment systems used to process online transactions.
Probably the main concern of most Internet users relates to the confidentiality
of payment card information, since disclosure of this information to a hostile
third party could enable that party to make fraudulent transactions at the
user’s expense. However, security for online transactions is not limited to data
confidentiality, but also includes other security services such as authentication,
identification, non-repudiation and data integrity.
In a typical debit/credit card payment system there are four parties involved,
namely a client, a merchant, an acquiring bank and a card issuing bank [33,
70]. A client, i.e. the cardholder, makes a payment using a card issued by
the card issuing bank (issuer) for something purchased from a merchant. The
acquiring bank (acquirer) is the financial institution with which a merchant
has a contractual arrangement for receiving (acquiring) card payments. The
underlying payment model is shown in Figure 3.1.
     financial network
     Issuing Bank                    Acquiring Bank
   physical communication [billing]   transaction  authorisation
     and    redemption
 transactions
       Client                            Merchant
Figure 3.1: Debit/credit card payment system.
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In this chapter, we consider the security requirements for each of the four
parties involved in an electronic commerce transaction. Some currently pro-
posed electronic commerce protocols are then described and briefly analysed
in terms of how well they satisfy these security requirements. Note that the
analysis is based on a typical Internet payment transaction, i.e. where a user
makes a payment by entering card details through a web interface, the mer-
chant server processes the transaction using a back-end authorisation system,
and this enables the transaction to be sent to the acquirer and subsequently to
the financial network.
Further discussion on security issues for e-commerce, and details of many of
the schemes described here, can be found in recent books on e-commerce, e.g.
[2, 26, 27, 33, 70, 82].
3.2 Security requirements
As shown in Figure 3.1, a typical card payment system involves four parties,
namely a card issuer, an acquirer, a merchant and a client. The security re-
quirements for each party vary and hence they will be examined individually.
However, the requirements for acquirers and issuers are combined since they are
both financial institutions, they are both contractually obliged to abide by the
rules of the relevant payment system, and it can reasonably be assumed that
they have a similar risk model.
3.2.1 Issuers and acquirers
1. Non-repudiation: Issuers and acquirers need to ensure that neither
clients nor merchants can deny their participation in a transaction (where
the transaction may involve a refund from merchant to client). In order
to achieve non-repudiation, identity authentication may also be needed.
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2. Authentication: Client authentication is required for the issuers and
acquirers so that they can prove that it is the client who authorised the
payment and that he/she is a legitimate cardholder. Otherwise, a client
can deny making a transaction and the issuer may end up being liable for
refunding the amount to the client. On the other hand, if an electronic
transaction is found to be fraudulent, merchants are liable for ‘card not
present’ chargebacks. Therefore, it is important for the acquirer to ensure
merchant non-repudiation to prevent them challenging their liability.
3. Integrity: It is also important to ensure that once details of a transaction
have been confirmed, no one can maliciously modify them. Merchants
must not be able to alter the amount that a client has agreed to pay. To
be more specific, it should not be possible for a merchant to change the
amount after it has been authorised by the card issuer. Similarly, a client
must not be able to change the amount that has been authorised.
4. Replay protection: A malicious merchant should not be able to use
a once authorised transaction to obtain a repeat payment. Additionally,
merchants should not be able to use an old transaction to request a new
payment authorisation no matter how many similar transactions the client
has made with them. Issuers and acquirers need a mechanism to detect if a
transaction has been replayed so that they do not authorise an illegitimate
transaction.
3.2.2 Merchants
1. Non-repudiation: Amerchant needs evidence that a customer has agreed
to pay the amount associated with a transaction. A merchant also needs
to verify that the client is the legitimate cardholder; otherwise, the mer-
chant can be liable for chargebacks. This occurs when a client tells his/her
issuer that a particular transaction was not made. The card issuer then
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immediately submits a chargeback to the acquirer to recover the amount
from the account of the merchant in question. Within a predefined period
of time, the merchant can dispute the chargeback by providing evidence
of, for example, purchase or delivery. Therefore, it is important for mer-
chants to have non-repudiable evidence of the transaction, i.e. to have
client non-repudiation. Furthermore, an issuer should not be able to deny
having authorised a payment.
2. Authentication: As stated before, merchants need client authentication
to make sure that the client is the legitimate cardholder. Moreover, they
need to be sure that they are communicating with the genuine acquirer.
Otherwise, an adversary may masquerade as an acquirer and authorise an
illegitimate transaction.
3. Integrity: No one should be able to change the details of a transaction
once they have been agreed upon. A merchant will not wish to be credited
with payment for less than the amount agreed. In addition, an acquirer or
issuer should not be able to modify a transaction that has been authorised.
4. Replay protection: A malicious client should not be able to present
an old proof of purchase to claim for repeat delivery of goods. Likewise,
it should not be possible for an acquirer to claim that a merchant has
obtained a payment using an old transaction.
3.2.3 Clients
1. Confidentiality and privacy: Transaction confidentiality, especially
card information confidentiality, may be the security service of most con-
cern to users. It is important that cardholder account details are kept
secret from any party except the issuer, since they are the main basis on
which Internet payments are made. Moreover, some users may require
confidentiality protection for the nature of their transactions.
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2. Integrity: As for the other parties, transaction integrity is important to
the client. No one should be able to maliciously modify the transaction de-
tails once they have been confirmed. Clients will not want an adversary to
change a delivery address, the price, or the description of the merchandise
after they have agreed a payment.
3. Authentication: A client needs to be sure that he/she is dealing with
a trustworthy merchant. When shopping on the Internet, it is relatively
easy to be lured into visiting a site which appears to sell something but
is actually simply collecting card details. Even though a client may have
made a purchase from a site before, it is not always obvious whether the
page that is being fetched is authentic.
4. Replay protection: Clients need a mechanism to ensure that a malicious
merchant or an adversary will not be able to reuse previously authorised
payments to make a repeat charge.
5. Non-repudiation: Clients also require non-repudiation, for example a
proof of payment so that no one involved in the transaction can repudiate
that a payment has occurred.
3.3 Meeting the security requirements
In this section, we examine various currently available security protocols. A
short description of how each protocol works is given, followed by a review of
the security services provided.
3.3.1 SSL and TLS
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [25, 33, 85] protocol was launched in 1994 by
Netscape, with the primary goal of providing secure communications between
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web browsers and web servers. Security services provided include server authen-
tication, data confidentiality, (optional) client authentication and data integrity.
In 1995, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) introduced a similar
protocol named Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.0 [11]. SSL and TLS
are by far the most widely used protocols providing security for transactions
made over the Internet. Because of their importance, the whole of Chapter 4 is
devoted to a detailed analysis of both SSL and TLS.
3.3.2 Secure Electronic Transaction (SET)
The Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) [76, 77, 78, 79] protocol was developed
by Visa, MasterCard and various computer companies to facilitate secure elec-
tronic commerce transactions. The protocol provides confidentiality of payment
card details, data integrity, authentication of both merchant and cardholder, and
the ability to validate or authorise transactions. SET extensively employs pub-
lic key cryptographic techniques to provide such security services. As a result,
one of the most important prerequisites for the protocol is that all the parties
involved must have their own distinct key pairs with corresponding public key
certificates. Moreover, cardholders have to install special software before they
can start using SET.
SET is a complex protocol involving more than ten steps for each transac-
tion, and it is not the aim of this chapter to provide full details of the protocol’s
operation. In brief, the protocol requires every participating party to crypto-
graphically sign transmitted messages. Sensitive information is also encrypted
using a secret session key. One of the most innovative features of SET may be
the use of a ‘dual signature’ which allows merchants to verify the integrity of
the order information yet not see the card details.
SET appears to be a well designed protocol that aims to provide a high
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level of security for Internet transactions, and that satisfies all the security
requirements outlined previously. Unfortunately, SET has not been adopted to
any significant extent — indeed, it is not clear whether it will ever become widely
used. One of the most important obstacles to SET implementation is that the
protocol is so complex that it is difficult and costly for the parties involved
to implement it. Moreover, the use of public key cryptographic techniques is
costly in terms of computational overhead, performance, and the Public Key
Infrastructure needed to support it. As a result, the benefits of security that
SET gives may not be sufficient to bring about its adoption.
3.3.3 Visa 3-Domain Secure
The 3-D Secure protocol has recently been developed by Visa [90, 91]. The
protocol aims to provide cardholder authentication for merchants using two
types of servers: Access Control Servers (ACSs) operated by card issuers and
the Visa Directory Server. The cardholder must enroll with his/her issuer ACS
before using the service.
When a transaction is to be made, the merchant server queries the Visa
Directory Server, using a Merchant Plug-In, to determine whether the card-
holder has registered for the authentication service. If so, the Visa Directory
Server returns the web address of the appropriate ACS to the merchant. The
merchant server then redirects the cardholder browser to that ACS which will
in turn prompt the cardholder to authenticate him/herself using a password
and/or a Visa smart card. If the authentication process is successful, the ACS
redirects the cardholder browser back to the the merchant server, which can
then proceed with the traditional authorisation process. The Visa 3-D Secure
also employs another server called the Authentication History server to log all
the authentication attempts of each cardholder.
It is clear that the protocol does not meet all the security requirements.
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Indeed, it does not attempt to do so, since its aim is only to provide cardholder
authentication and the associated non-repudiation to reduce or eliminate the
risk of card-not-present chargebacks, i.e. where the merchant is required to take
liability for a disputed transaction if the card was not physically present at the
merchant premises at the time of the transaction. The protocol is also kept
simple to facilitate implementation.
3.3.4 MasterCard Secure Payment Application
The MasterCard Secure Payment Application (SPA)1 is a security solution for
securing payments between Merchants and Issuers for card-not-present trans-
actions via the Internet i.e. where the card does not present at the merchant
site when the transaction is made. As for Visa 3-D Secure, the scheme is de-
signed to provide cardholder authentication and hence reduce chargebacks. The
scheme is proprietary to MasterCard and its specification is available only to
the technology vendor community.
The security of SPA is based on MasterCard’s Universal Cardholder Authen-
tication Field (UCAF) infrastructure, which is used to communicate authenti-
cation information between the cardholder, issuer, merchant and acquirer. As
with other protocols, the cardholder must register with his/her issuer before
using the service.
A typical SPA transaction begins when the merchant requests payment
card details. The checkout page that the merchant sends will include hidden
fields which provide the information necessary to generate UCAF data. The
issuer SPA server then verifies the cardholder’s identity using an authentication
method of the issuer’s choice. Subsequently, a transaction-specific authenti-
cation token, referred to as ‘SPA-UCAF’, will be generated by the issuer and
returned to the cardholder. The cardholder then presents the SPA-UCAF to
1details are available at http://www.mastercardintl.com/spa/demo/main.html
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the merchant which will use it, in addition to other information, to submit an
authorisation request to its acquirer. Once the issuer received the authorisation
request, it validates the SPA-UCAF and proceeds with the ‘standard’ authori-
sation process.
MasterCard SPA provides two security services, namely cardholder authen-
tication and non-repudiation. As for Visa 3-D Secure, it is too early to tell how
great an impact this scheme will have.
3.3.5 Summary
By far, the most widely used protocol to provide security for Internet transac-
tions is SSL/TLS, despite the fact that it was not designed as an e-commerce
security protocol. SSL/TLS is used by most Internet merchants as a de facto
standard means to provide their customers with assurance that the transaction
they are making is being protected.
In contrast, SET, which has been specifically designed to provide security
for electronic commerce transactions, has not been widely adopted. In the last
couple of years, Visa and MasterCard have each developed their own initiatives
to provide simpler and more easily implemented security protocols. However,
the future for secure Internet transactions remains unclear.
A lesson to learn from this may be that security comes with cost. It is very
important to design a protocol that both works (i.e. is not too complex so that it
will be adopted) and provides an acceptable level of security. Therefore, it is the
aim of the thesis to design protocols which meet as many security requirements
as possible and also remain usable.
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4. SSL/TLS Analysis
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the effectiveness of SSL/TLS in terms of
how well it satisfies the security requirements outlined in Chapter 3. The chapter
also aims to identify security services which are not provided by SSL/TLS. This
is needed in order to facilitate the design of protocols proposed later in this
thesis.
In this chapter, an overview of how SSL and TLS work is first provided
in Section 4.2, followed by the analysis (Section 4.3) and conclusions. It is
important to note that much of the material in this chapter has previously been
described in [56].
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4.1 Introduction
SSL and TLS are currently the most widely used protocols for providing security
for the client/merchant Internet link. Therefore, in this chapter we investigate
how effectively SSL and TLS serve this purpose, also bearing in mind the secu-
rity requirements for information handling at the client and merchant sites. It
is important to note that the analysis in this chapter is based on a business to
consumer (B2C) transaction using a debit/credit card. Further detailed discus-
sion of the security properties of SSL and TLS can be found in recent books,
e.g. [33] and [73].
An overview of how SSL and TLS work, including a review of their major
differences is first provided. We subsequently examine the effectiveness of the
protocols by considering how well they satisfy the security requirements outlined
in the previous chapter. The final section summarises and concludes the chapter.
4.2 An overview of SSL and TLS
In order to examine the effectiveness of SSL and TLS in securing electronic
transactions, it is first necessary to consider how they work. Therefore, in this
section we briefly describe how SSL and TLS operate. More detailed specifica-
tions can be found in [11, 25, 73, 85].
4.2.1 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol was launched in 1994 by Netscape,
with the primary goal of providing secure communications between web browsers
and web servers. Security services provided include server authentication, data
confidentiality, (optional) client authentication and data integrity. The following
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description of SSL operation is based on SSL 3.0, the current version at the time
of writing.
SSL is divided into two layers, namely the SSL handshake protocol and the
record layer. The handshake protocol, which is the upper layer, is responsible for
initialising and synchronising cryptographic state between the communicating
parties. The record layer provides confidentiality and authentication, including
protection against replay attacks.
In the most typical case, five main steps are required to establish an SSL
connection.
1. The client’s browser first sends a ClientHello message to the web server.
This message consists of a list of the cipher suites the browser supports,
the version of SSL it uses, the data compression methods it can employ,
and a challenge string (a random number and a session ID).
2. The server sends back a ServerHello message consisting of the SSL version
number, a challenge string, and the selected cipher suite and compression
method. Then the server sends a ServerKeyExchange message containing
the server’s public key information. The server can optionally request the
client’s certificate for user authentication by sending a CertificateRequest
message. Finally the server sends a ServerHelloDone message to indicate
that it has finished with its initial negotiation messages.
3. The client sends its certificate (if requested by the server) in a Certificate
message. This is followed by a ClientKeyExchange message which contains
key information, i.e. the ‘premaster secret’ that will be used as a seed to
generate the master secret and keys subsequently used for encryption.
The key information is encrypted with the server’s public key. If client
identification is required, a CertificateVerify message must be sent to prove
that the client has the private key corresponding to the public key in the
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certificate. The CertificateVerify message essentially contains a signed
hash of the key information and all previous SSL handshake messages
exchanged so far.
4. The client sends a ChangeCipherSpec message to indicate the starting
point of a protected channel, followed by a ClientFinish message which
contains a hash of the handshake messages exchanged by the systems and
the key information. The ClientFinish message is encrypted and authen-
ticated using the algorithms in the negotiated cipher suite. Note that
ChangeCipherSpec messages are not considered as handshake messages
and thus are not included in the hash.
5. The server sends back a ChangeCipherSpec message and a ServerFinish
message which are similar to the messages with corresponding names sent
by the client.
The next section briefly explains how TLS operates, and the differences
between SSL and TLS.
4.2.2 Transport Layer Security (TLS)
In 1995, the IETF introduced a similar protocol called Transport Layer Security
(TLS) version 1.0 [11, 73, 85]. Operationally, SSL and TLS work in a very similar
way. However, there are some significant differences, as follows.
• The protocol version appearing in SSL messages is 3.0 while for TLS it is
3.1.
• TLS offers 11 more alert message types than SSL.
• For message authentication, SSL combines key information and applica-
tion data in an SSL-unique fashion. By contrast, TLS employs a widely
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used and standardised method for computing a Message Authentication
Code (MAC), i.e. the HMAC technique [45, 60], to provide message au-
thentication.
• TLS employs a simpler CertificateVerify message. The signed information
includes only the handshake messages exchanged so far. However, in SSL,
the information consists of a two-round hash of the handshake messages,
the master secret and the padding.
• TLS employs a pseudorandom function (prf) to generate key materials
using a master secret, a label in which the name of the key is specified,
and a seed as initial inputs. SSL, by contrast, uses a complex and rather
ad hoc procedure to generate key materials.
• The Finish message of SSL is created in an ad hoc way whereas it is
generated by a pseudorandom function in TLS.
• The cipher suites offer in SSL includes Fortezza, while in TLS it does not.
The differences are summarised in Table 4.1 [85].
Table 4.1: Differences between SSL and TLS
Attributes SSL v3.0 TLS v1.0
Protocol version in messages 3.0 3.1
Alert message types 12 23
Message authentication ad hoc standard
Key material generation ad hoc prf
CertificateVerify message complex simple
Finished message ad hoc prf
Baseline cipher suites Fortezza no Fortezza
Although these differences between the two protocols exist, in the remainder
of the thesis both protocols will be referred to as SSL/TLS unless explicitly
stated otherwise.
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4.3 Analysis
This section analyses the effectiveness of SSL/TLS as a method for securing
electronic payments. This is achieved by examining how well it satisfies the
security requirements described in Section 3.2. Since SSL/TLS was designed
to protect communications between web clients and web servers, the analysis
will only address interactions between clients and merchants (see Figure 3.1).
Clearly, SSL/TLS cannot, by itself, address any security issues relating to inter-
actions between other pairs of parties. In any event, interactions between issuers
and cardholders (mainly relating to card issue and billing) are outside the scope
of this thesis. Similarly, we can assume that interactions between issuers and
acquirers are addressed in the context of securing the financial network, and
hence are again outside the scope of this thesis.
As far as the acquirer/merchant interactions are concerned, security services
can be provided by separate security mechanisms operating to protect commu-
nications between the merchant server and the acquirer host. Such mechanisms
would typically be managed by the acquirer.
4.3.1 Confidentiality
SSL/TLS protects transaction confidentiality by using symmetric encryption.
The encryption algorithm to be used in any particular connection depends on the
cipher suite negotiated in the handshake protocol. Although SSL/TLS protects
the confidentiality of transferred data against interception attacks, there remain
some risks which need to be examined.
Since SSL/TLS was designed to provide confidentiality between web clients
and web servers, transaction information is protected only while it is being trans-
mitted. Therefore, information such as clients’ account details and addresses
are available to the merchant. The users thus have to rely on the security of the
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merchant’s web server. If someone succeeds in penetrating the merchant server,
potentially large numbers of user account details could be compromised.
Another issue is that the US federal regulations have severely restricted the
export of strong encryption technology. Until recently, this meant that popularly
available SSL/TLS implementations only used relatively short key lengths unless
both the communicating parties were within the US or Canada [6].
In October 2000 the US export restrictions were relaxed to allow SSL/TLS
to use longer key lengths when the parties are in the EU or one of eight other
countries, namely Australia, New Zealand, Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan,
Norway, Poland and Switzerland [6]. However, risks clearly remain for clients
and merchants in countries outside the scope of this new exemption. Moreover,
this new exemption still only permits 56-bit secret keys, for which exhaustive
key searches can be performed [24]. However, it is probably hard to imagine a
circumstance where it would be worth the effort of breaking such a key given
that it will only reveal the details of a single transaction.
SSL/TLS also protects the confidentiality of information regarding the na-
ture and value of the transaction whilst this information is transmitted across
the Internet. Of course, SSL/TLS cannot offer any protection for the confiden-
tiality of this data whilst it is stored at the merchant — in any case such protec-
tion is probably meaningless since the merchant will clearly need to know this
information. However when using SSL/TLS for security the merchant will also
know the account details of the purchaser, and hence can use these to link trans-
actions and build profiles of user purchasing behaviour. If required, consumer
anonymity could possibly be achieved by using alternative payment mechanisms
— see, for example, [84]. However, if the merchant needs the shipping address to
deliver the purchased goods, then achieving purchaser anonymity will be rather
difficult!
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4.3.2 Integrity
As for confidentiality, SSL/TLS provides integrity protection for transferred
data only. Consequently, if an adversary succeeds in compromising either the
merchant server or the client PC, it would be possible for them to modify the
information stored. As a result, such information will not be helpful if there is a
dispute. Moreover, for the same reasons, SSL/TLS offers no protection against
modification of transaction information by corrupt merchants or clients.
4.3.3 Authentication
We next consider how SSL/TLS supports the required authentication services
— we subdivide this discussion into considerations of merchant authentication
and client authentication.
4.3.3.1 Merchant authentication
The SSL/TLS protocol uses the server certificate as the basis of server au-
thentication. The client verifies the server by verifying its ability to decrypt
information encrypted using the server’s public key. Nevertheless, there remain
some risks of server masquerade. One possibility is by means of a ‘man in
the middle attack’. Such an attack can be launched relatively easily by using
a sniffing application such as dsniff1 to intercept the communications between
two entities at the stage of SSL/TLS initialisation.
Briefly, the man in the middle attack operates as follows. After successfully
inserting themselves in the middle of the communication, the attacker simply
fetches the page requested by the client from the genuine server. Upon receipt of
the requested page, the malicious server returns the spoofed page to the client.
1http://www.monkey.org/∼dugsong/dsniff/
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The spoofed page is the page containing rewritten URLs of the links on the page.
This enables the attacker to maintain a compromised link between the client
and whichever server is visited, since if the client clicks on any links on the page,
the request will go through the attacker and the process repeats [19, 27, 95].
An alternative means of launching this attack would be to use ‘web spoofing’
instead of a sniffing application. However, in this latter case, the user must first
be lured into visiting the attacker’s page [27], and from then on every subsequent
site can be modified by the attacker. This can be implemented relatively simply
merely by requesting the genuine web page. Upon receipt of the page, the
malicious server prefixes the URL of the genuine site with its URL and returns
the spoofed page to the user. In other words, the attacker acts as a proxy for the
user to visit other web sites, thereby obtaining the ability to read and modify
information.
If an SSL/TLS connection is in use, the attacker simply establishes two
secure connections, one with the client and the other with the server. Thereby,
he/she can read and modify the information sent between the two parties as well
as convince them that they are communicating via a secure channel. However,
since SSL/TLS requires server authentication, the attack should be prevented by
the client examining the certificate or the URL of the page, since the certificate
will show the URL of the attacker instead of the genuine server. However, the
attacker can control the appearance of the URL to the client by using scripting
techniques — moreover, users will often neglect to check such details, since web
browsers tend to be designed to make things as easy as possible and minimise
the work for the user. Hence, although the server authentication in SSL/TLS
prevents such attacks in theory, the practical situation is rather different.
The second place that the attack can be revealed is the status line. When
the user points a mouse at a rewritten link, the status line shows the URL to
which the link leads. At the moment of loading a requested page, the prefixed
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URL also shows in the status line. Nevertheless, scripts such as JavaScript and
ActiveX can be used to change what should appear in both the location line
and status line [19].
The final means for the user to detect the attack is the source of the page.
A user can see the source of a page by choosing View −→ Source in Internet
Explorer and View −→ Page Source in Netscape Navigator. Fortunately the
attacker cannot hide the rewritten links in the source code of the page. However,
the source code of the page is written in HTML and, for the vast majority of
users, will be completely incomprehensible. Indeed, very few web surfers are
even aware that they can look at the source of every page they view.
Remedies suggested in [19] are to disable JavaScript, make sure that location
line is always visible, and take note of the URLs displayed on the location line.
However, these solutions depend heavily on individual users strictly following
all the suggestions. In other words, it will not be very useful to disable scripts
but yet never look at the location line or status line. Moreover, by disabling
scripts, some sites may not function properly and users can lose the interactive
features inherent in web browsing.
4.3.3.2 Client authentication
While server authentication is mandatory, client authentication is an optional
part of SSL/TLS. If client authentication is to be provided, a public key pair
and certificate for the client are required. However, most clients do not have
key pairs and public key certificates. Even if they do, in most cases the key pair
is stored in their PC. This gives rise to a further threat, since anyone who has
access to the user’s PC and knows the corresponding PIN/password to decrypt
the private/secret keys may gain the ability to make transactions on behalf of
the user. This is especially the case where the merchant uses the client identity
to access records containing user personal information including mailing address
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and account details.
Finally, even if the user does possess a client certificate, it may not be of any
use to the merchant unless it has been issued by a CA trusted by all participants.
This is because a general purpose client certificate will typically only contain a
user name and an email address. There will thus be no secure linking between
the certificate and the cardholder details being used by the merchant (i.e. the
account number), since it is typically possible for a user to obtain a general
purpose client certificate in any user’s name.
4.3.4 Non-repudiation
Although SSL/TLS uses signatures for session establishment, all protection
of communicated data is achieved using symmetric cryptographic techniques.
Hence SSL/TLS provides no non-repudiation services; that is, neither client nor
merchant has any cryptographic evidence that a transaction has taken place.
4.3.5 Replay protection
SSL/TLS provides protection against third party replay attacks by including
random numbers in the handshake protocol. However, since SSL/TLS simply
provides a secure means of communication between clients and servers, and
provides no long-term ‘evidence’ regarding transactions (as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3.4), SSL/TLS does not provide any protection against manipulation
(including replay) or repudiation of transaction information by merchants or
clients.
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4.3.6 Summary
The security services that SSL/TLS provides are summarised in Table 4.2, where
they are mapped against the security requirements identified in Section 3.2.
Table 4.2: Security services provided by SSL and TLS
Security Requirements SSL and TLS
Issuers and acquirers security requirements Not Applicable
Merchant/Client non-repudiation Not Provided
Merchant authentication Provided
Client authentication Optional
Data integrity En route protection
Replay protection Third party protection
Data confidentiality En route protection
4.4 Conclusions
Although each party involved in an electronic transaction has a different risk
model, they share some fundamental security requirements. These are confiden-
tiality, authentication, non-repudiation, integrity and replay protection.
Because of the very nature of the protocol, SSL/TLS provides confidential-
ity and integrity only while the information is being transmitted. Once the
information has reached its destination, SSL/TLS offers no protection, and any
security measures depend on the choices of the communicating parties. As a
result, there are risks of information being compromised if either side of the
communication has been penetrated.
SSL/TLS only mandates server authentication. Therefore, even if SSL/TLS
is used to protect electronic transactions, the merchant is not protected against
a criminal impersonating a genuine user (using stolen account information).
Moreover, SSL/TLS does not provide either clients or merchants with protection
against repudiation. This makes transaction information stored by either party
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of limited value in the event of a dispute.
SSL/TLS provides only partial protection against replay attacks. It prevents
a third party using an intercepted SSL/TLS message. However, it does not
prevent corrupt merchants or clients re-using a transaction.
From the analysis, two issues are worth noting. Firstly, since SSL and TLS
were not designed specifically to secure payments over the Internet, not surpris-
ingly they do not satisfy all the security requirements for electronic transactions.
It is important that e-commerce clients and merchants do not have a false sense
of security when using them. Secondly, it would be interesting to see how elec-
tronic transaction security could be enhanced by combining use of SSL/TLS
with certain additional simple security features, as an alternative to accepting
the significant cost of adopting a more complex solution such as SET, or use
of a solution with relatively limited security functionality, such as Visa’s 3-D
Secure. Indeed, this latter issue is the primary aim of this thesis.
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5. EMV Cards in E-Commerce
The aim of this chapter is to propose a way to use EMV compliant cards to
enhance the security of Internet payments. In Section 5.2, the way in which an
EMV card transaction is processed is described. This is followed in Section 5.3
by a specification of the new protocol. An analysis of threats that may arise to
the proposed protocol is then given in Section 5.4. A way in which a trusted
card reader can be used in conjunction with the proposed protocol is examined
in Section 5.5, followed, in Section 5.6, by a review of the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed protocols.
Much of the material in this chapter has previously been described in [58].
61
5. EMV Cards in E-Commerce
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we are concerned with e-commerce transactions in which a
consumer makes a payment using a debit/credit card. As was discussed in
Chapter 4, in such transactions the communications link between the consumer
PC and the merchant server is typically protected against eavesdropping using
SSL/TLS. Although SSL/TLS has become a de facto standard means to secure
an electronic transaction made over the Internet, as discussed in Section 4.3 it
does not satisfy all the security requirements. To be precise, it only provides
security for the communications link between the consumer PC and the mer-
chant server. As a result, there are a number of security risks in such use of
SSL/TLS, as pointed out in [82]. One of these is the lack of client authentication
and the associated lack of client non-repudiation. Even though SSL/TLS offers
client-side authentication, it is optional and rarely used. Consequently, it is not
easy to verify if the client is the legitimate cardholder and there is no way to
determine if the client actually has the card. A malicious user, who may have
obtained a card number by some means, can then use it to make payments over
the Internet at the expense of the legitimate cardholder.
Meanwhile, for transactions taking place at the Point of Sale (POS), a variety
of frauds are possible against debit/credit card transactions. In recent years
this has led the major card brands to develop an industry standard means of
employing IC cards to replace the existing magnetic stripe cards, with a view to
both reducing fraud and reducing the costs associated with online transaction
authorisation at the POS. This collaboration between Europay, MasterCard
and Visa resulted in the EMV card/terminal specifications, the latest version
of which are known as EMV 2000 [13, 14, 15, 16]. These specifications are
now managed by a jointly owned organisation known as EMVCo. The EMV
specifications standardise interactions between a debit/credit IC card and a
terminal. Nevertheless, the EMV specifications were not designed to provide
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security for electronic transactions made over the Internet.
In an annex to Book 3 of EMV 2000 [15], the use of an EMV card and the
Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol [76, 77, 78, 79] to conduct an e-
commerce transaction is defined. However, SET (which provides security for an
entire e-commerce transaction) has not been adopted to any significant extent.
Although the integration of EMV and SET removes some of the issues with
SET, notably it simplifies user registration, there still remain large obstacles to
its adoption (see Section 3.3.2).
As a result, in this chapter an alternative way in which the growing use of
EMV IC cards can be utilised to enhance the security of e-commerce transactions
is proposed. The goal is to design a scheme whereby EMV cards can be used
to enhance e-commerce transaction security, and hence reduce fraud, whilst
imposing minimal overheads on the involved parties.
In this chapter, an overview of the EMV payment system is first provided
in Section 5.2, followed by a description of the proposed technique to use EMV
cards for enhancing the security of Internet electronic transaction processing.
Threats to the proposed scheme are then examined in Section 5.4.
It is possible that ‘trusted’ card readers, with simple user interfaces such
as a PIN pad and a small display, could become more common in the future.
Section 5.5, therefore, examines how the proposed scheme might operate if such
card readers were used. The security implications of the use of a card reader
in the protocol are also discussed. Finally, Section 5.6 contains an analysis of
advantages and disadvantages of the protocols.
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5.2 An overview of EMV
The debit/credit card payment system, in which there are four major parties,
namely a client, a merchant, an acquiring bank and a card issuing bank, is the
model underlying the EMV 2000 system [13, 14, 15, 16, 70]. The payment model
is shown in Figure 3.1.
The EMV transaction process involves the following steps. Note that the
order of the steps is not completely fixed; for example, cardholder verification
can precede data authentication.
1. When the IC card is inserted, the terminal reads application data from the
card and performs Terminal Risk Management. Terminal Risk Manage-
ment provides positive issuer authorisation for high-value transactions and
ensures that transactions initiated from IC cards go online periodically to
prevent threats that might be undetectable in an oﬄine environment. The
exact frequency with which transactions are forced online is not specified
in EMV 2000, and is thus acquirer and brand specific.
2. The Data Authentication process enables the terminal to verify the au-
thenticity of the card. There are two options for Data Authentication,
namely Static and Dynamic Data Authentication, where Dynamic Data
Authentication, unlike Static Data Authentication, requires the card to
possess its own signature key pair and to compute signatures. Not all
EMV cards are capable of performing Dynamic Data Authentication.
3. After successful Data Authentication, the Processing Restrictions are per-
formed to determine the compatibility of the terminal and IC card appli-
cations.
4. Cardholder authenticity is verified by PIN entry. The PIN verification
process can be either online to the issuer or oﬄine to the card.
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5. After successful Cardholder Authentication, the terminal performs Termi-
nal Action Analysis, which results in a decision as to whether the transac-
tion should be approved oﬄine, declined oﬄine, or an online authorisation
performed.
6. The IC card then performs Card Risk Management to protect the card
issuer against fraud or excessive credit risk. Details of card risk manage-
ment algorithms are specific to the issuer and are not specified by EMV.
7. The IC card performs Card Action Analysis to further decide whether the
transaction will be processed oﬄine, or will need online authorisation (if
either Terminal Action Analysis or Card Action Analysis decide that on-
line authorisation is required then this must take place). If the decision is
oﬄine processing, the transaction is processed immediately. If the trans-
action is to be processed online, Online Processing will be performed to
ensure that the issuer can review and authorise or reject transactions that
are outside acceptable limits of risk defined by the issuer, the payment
system, or the acquirer. Issuers can also perform Script Processing, en-
abling command scripts to be sent to the card by the terminal to perform
functions that may not necessarily be relevant to the current transaction
but are important for the continued functioning of the card application.
8. The final process is Completion which ends the processing of a transaction.
The EMV process can be presented in flow chart form, as shown in Figure 5.1.
In essence, the EMV scheme supports both cardholder authentication by PIN
entry and IC card authentication through Static or Dynamic Data Authenti-
cation. Therefore, an unscrupulous user will find it hard to make a fraudulent
transaction without possessing the actual card and the corresponding PIN.
We next focus on the security-related interactions between IC card and ter-
minal. This is of particular interest here since, in the scheme proposed below,
65
5. EMV Cards in E-Commerce
Start
IC Card Inserted
Initiate Application
Process
Terminal gets data
from the card
Data
Authentication
Terminal Risk
Management
Static
Authentication
Dynamic
Authentication
Dynamic Data
Authentication
Processing
Restrictions
Cardholder
Verification
2
no
yes
66
5. EMV Cards in E-Commerce
1
     Online
PIN Process
Online PIN Verification
Terminal Action Analysis
Online/offline
Authorisation
no
yes
Terminal generates AC
command for ARQC
online
Reject/Accept
offline
reject
Terminal
generates AC
for AAC
accept
Terminal generates AC
for TC
Card Risk Management
Card Action Analysis
3
67
5. EMV Cards in E-Commerce
2
Online/offline
Authorisation
Accept/reject Card generates TC
offline
online
accept
reject
Card generates AAC
Card responses with
ARQC
Online Processing
Script Processing
Complete
Figure 5.1: EMV card process flowchart.
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the user PC plays the role of the merchant terminal and interacts with a mer-
chant server across the Internet. The merchant server communicates with the
acquirer, e.g. using the same interface as is currently used for merchant terminal-
acquirer communications. An acquirer and an issuer typically communicate via
a brand-specific network, the details of which are outside the scope of this thesis.
5.2.1 Card authentication
The EMV specifications allow card authentication to be either oﬄine or online.
The decision regarding whether to perform online authentication depends on
the capability of both the IC card and the terminal, and can be made at the
time of the transaction.
The card authentication process is performed using two kinds of data au-
thentication: static data authentication and dynamic data authentication. A
signature scheme with message recovery, compliant with ISO/IEC 9796-2 [44],
is used to support both data authentication schemes. Static data authentication
is mandatory whereas dynamic data authentication is optional.
5.2.1.1 Static data authentication
Static data authentication involves the terminal verifying the integrity of static
data signed by the card issuer and stored in the IC card. The card does not
need its own signature key pair to support this type of authentication.
Static data authentication is supported by a two-level key management hier-
archy. The top-level certification authority (CA) is operated by the card scheme,
i.e. Visa or MasterCard. This CA certifies the issuer public keys. The static
data is signed using an issuer private key and stored in the card, along with the
CA-signed certificate for the appropriate issuer public key. A terminal with a
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trusted copy of the CA public key can then verify the issuer public key certifi-
cate and hence can verify the signature on the static data, thereby verifying the
IC card.
5.2.1.2 Dynamic data authentication
Like static data authentication, dynamic data authentication is based on digital
signatures, although in dynamic data authentication the card has its own key
pair. The terminal sends an Internal Authenticate Command (IAC), includ-
ing an unpredictable number, to the card. The card then digitally signs the
IAC data and returns the signature to the terminal. The terminal verifies the
signature to authenticate the dynamic data and hence the card.
Dynamic data authentication is supported by a three-level key management
hierarchy. The first and second level CAs are operated by the card scheme and
issuer respectively, and the card public key is certified by its issuer. In order
to verify the signed data, the terminal needs to contain the top-level CA public
key to verify the issuer public key certificate. The issuer public key is then used
to verify the IC card public key certificate. The terminal can then verify the
card signature.
5.2.2 Cardholder verification
The cardholder is verified using a PIN. The EMV specifications require every
EMV card to possess a method to limit the number of unsuccessful PIN tries.
PIN verification may occur oﬄine to the IC card, or online to the card issuer
(or a third party acting for the card issuer). For oﬄine verification the PIN may
be asymmetrically encrypted between the PIN pad and the IC card. Either a
key pair assigned especially for PIN encryption or the key pair used in dynamic
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data authentication can be used for encryption. In either case, the card public
key is first retrieved by the PIN pad or a secure terminal component. The IC
card also sends a random number to be concatenated with the entered PIN.
The result is encrypted and sent back to the card. The card then decrypts the
ciphertext, checks the random number and verifies whether the recovered PIN
matches the one stored in the card.
5.2.3 Application cryptograms
Transaction message integrity and origin authentication are guaranteed by the
use of Application Cryptograms (ACs), generated by the IC card and issuer us-
ing shared-secret-based Message Authentication Codes (MACs). There are four
types of ACs, namely Transaction Certificates (TCs), Application Authentica-
tion Cryptograms (AACs), Authorisation Request Cryptograms (ARQCs) and
Authorisation Response Cryptograms (ARPCs). If the transaction is approved
oﬄine, the card generates a TC which is stored by the merchant and passed to
the acquirer as part of the clearing process. If the transaction is declined oﬄine,
then an AAC is generated. If the transaction needs to be approved online, the
card generates an ARQC which will be sent to the issuer. The issuer then re-
sponses with an ARPC indicating whether the transaction should be approved
or declined. As in the oﬄine case, if the transaction is approved by the issuer,
the card computes a TC; otherwise, an AAC is computed.
As mentioned above, ACs are cryptographically protected using a MAC.
The issuer and card share a long term secret key MKAC known as the card
AC master key. This master key is used to generate an AC session key (SKAC)
which is used to compute the AC MACs. The session key SKAC is computed
as a function of MKAC and diversification data R; the value of R must be
different for each session key generation to prevent replay attacks. Note also
that, to avoid the issuer having to store the master key MKAC for every card,
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each such master key is derived from an issuer master key MKI . This key
derivation takes as input the Primary Account Number (PAN) and the PAN
sequence number.
5.3 Using EMV cards for e-commerce transac-
tions
We now describe one way in which an EMV-compliant IC card can be used to
conduct remote transactions. The system architecture is described, as are the
transaction processing procedures and how security services are provided.
5.3.1 System architecture
The e-commerce payment system we describe employs five main components:
an EMV card, an IC card reader, the Cardholder System, the Merchant Server,
and the Acquirer. The system is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Remote EMV system architecture
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5.3.1.1 EMV card and IC card reader
The tasks of the EMV card are the same as those given in the EMV Speci-
fications. The card is assumed to be a completely ‘standard’ dynamic-data-
authentication-capable EMV card — indeed, the scheme is designed so that
existing EMV cards can be used to support e-commerce security without any
modification. The EMV card interacts with a combination of system compo-
nents, i.e. the card reader, the Cardholder System and the Merchant Server,
just as it does with a merchant POS terminal.
The IC card reader, which can include a PIN pad, is required for interactions
between the cardholder and the card, and between the card and the Cardholder
System. Physical requirements for this device are similar to those in [13].
5.3.1.2 Cardholder System
The Cardholder System is the combination of hardware and software required to
interact with the cardholder, the IC card, and the Merchant Server. The Card-
holder System is assumed here to be a combination of a user PC and special
purpose software which could, for example, be either a small program distributed
with the IC card by the issuer or, to make system installation maximally trans-
parent, a web browser applet. The source of cardholder system software is not
an issue we address here, but it might be the card issuer, the card brand, or
an associated party. The Cardholder System is jointly responsible, along with
the IC card reader and the Merchant Server, for performing the tasks of the
terminal defined in the EMV specifications.
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5.3.1.3 Merchant Server and Acquirer
The Merchant Server is the component that interacts with the Cardholder Sys-
tem to support electronic payments. The Merchant Server and Cardholder Sys-
tem communicate using the Internet. In our protocol, we utilise the fact that
in today’s electronic transactions the Internet link is typically protected using
SSL/TLS. Therefore, we assume throughout that SSL/TLS is used wherever
necessary to provide merchant server authentication, data confidentiality and
integrity for the Cardholder System/Merchant Server communication link.
The Merchant Server also interacts with the Acquirer. The choice of the
communication link between the two is not an issue here. However, it could be
the Internet or a special purpose link provided by the acquirer. As specified
above, the Merchant Server, the Cardholder System and the IC card reader
collectively fulfill the role of the EMVmerchant terminal. The Acquirer interacts
with the issuer via the financial network to support transaction authorisation.
To support static and dynamic data authentication, the Merchant Server needs
a trusted copy of the CA public key to enable it to verify issuer public key
certificates.
5.3.2 Transaction processing procedures
In this section, we describe the processes necessary to complete a payment
transaction. The protocol for using an EMV card for an e-commerce transaction
is also described. The decision about which purchase to make is outside the
scope of this thesis — we simply assume that the cardholder and the merchant
wish to perform a specified transaction.
The transaction flow is shown in Figure 5.3. In the protocol description,X‖Y
denotes the concatenation of data items X and Y . Other terms are defined as
they arise in the text below.
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IC Card Cardholder System Merchant Server       Acquirer
   1. Static Data Authentication
2. IAC || PI
-display the purchase
 information(PI)to the cardholder
-check the IC card
 presence, and forward
      3. IAC
4. SIC(DAD)||CertIC
         5. SIC(DAD) || CertIC
-verify the certificate,
 the public key and the
 signature
6. Processing Restrictions
-cardholder enters PIN
 via either keyboard or
 PIN pad
7. PIN Verification Request
-PIN verification
 process
8. PIN Verification Response
-if PIN verification
 response is success, perform
 Risk Management. Otherwise, end.
   9. AC Command
-perform card action analysis
-generate Application
 Cryptogram
  10. TC/AAC/ARQC
      11. TC/AAC/ARQC
-check TC/AAC/ARQC against PI
-if TC/AAC is sent,
 store it with PI
 and the protocol ends.
-if ARQC is sent,
 send message 12.
      12. ARQC||PI
 13. ARPC, (Script Process)
14. ARPC, (Script Process)
15. ARPC, (Script Process)
     16. TC/AAC
        17. TC/AAC
-store TC/AAC with PI and end.
Figure 5.3: Transaction flow for remote EMV
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5.3.2.1 Card authentication and processing restrictions
A transaction begins after the cardholder has decided to make a purchase. The
Merchant Server and the EMV card first perform static data authentication
(step 1 in Figure 5.3). In this process, an authentication request message is
sent from the Merchant Server to the Cardholder System and thence to the IC
card. A Static Application Data (SAD) message is subsequently sent back from
the IC card to the Cardholder System and thence to the Merchant Server. The
Merchant Server then verifies the issuer public key certificate using its copy of
the CA public key. The issuer signature on the Static Application Data (SAD),
sent by the IC card, is then verified. Data communicated between the Merchant
Server and the card are sent and received via the Cardholder System. Note that
the data are protected by SSL/TLS protocol while they are being transmitted
over the Internet.
After successful static data authentication, the Merchant Server generates
a random number, which is sent in the IAC, and constructs the purchase in-
formation (PI), which may contain a description of goods, the price, the date,
and a transaction identifier. The Merchant Server then sends IAC‖PI to the
Cardholder System (step 2). The IAC is required to initiate the computation of
the Signed Dynamic Application Data by the IC card. According to the EMV
2000 specifications [15], the command consists of the authentication-related data
which is proprietary to an application. However, it is mandatory for the IAC
to contain an unpredictable number [14].
Upon receipt of the above message, the Cardholder System displays the pur-
chase information to the cardholder and forwards the IAC to the card (step 3).
The IC card then computes the Signed Dynamic Application Data, SIC(DAD),
where SA(X) represents the signature on data string X using the private key
of entity A, and where DAD is the Dynamic Application Data containing the
random number sent in the IAC. The IC card then sends the signature to the
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Cardholder System along with the IC card’s public key certificate CertIC (step
4), where CertA denotes a certificate for the public key of entity A. In step 5,
the Cardholder System sends SIC(DAD)‖CertIC to the Merchant Server. Since
the issuer public key is used and verified in the static data authentication pro-
cess, the Merchant Server now only needs to verify the card certificate and then
the signature SIC(DAD).
After successful card authentication, Processing Restrictions (step 6) is per-
formed. Data Authentication and Processing Restrictions take place between
Merchant Server and card, and the Cardholder System simply forwards mes-
sages. Note that these processes remain unchanged from the EMV specification.
5.3.2.2 Cardholder verification
The Cardholder System next requests the cardholder to enter the PIN. PIN
verification can take place online or oﬄine depending on the Cardholder Verifi-
cation Methods (CVMs) specified in the card by the issuer. To perform oﬄine
verification, the Cardholder System sends a PIN Verification Request message
to the IC card (step 7). The PIN does not need to be encrypted, since the
environment is under cardholder control. On receipt of the PIN Verification
Request, the EMV card returns a PIN Verification Response message (step 8)
which indicates whether PIN verification has been successful. If so, the Card-
holder System performs Terminal Risk Management; otherwise, the protocol
ends.
5.3.2.3 Terminal risk management and action analysis
After successful cardholder verification, the Cardholder System performs Ter-
minal Risk Management and Terminal Action Analysis. These two processes
are as in the EMV specification. The Cardholder System then generates and
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sends an AC Command to the EMV card (step 9).
5.3.2.4 Card action analysis
The IC card first performs its own risk management and then executes the Card
Action Analysis to determine whether the transaction is to be approved oﬄine,
rejected oﬄine, or processed online. In step 10, an AC will be generated by the
IC card and sent to the Cardholder System where the nature of the AC will
depend on the result of the Card Action Analysis (for details see below). The
Cardholder System in turn forwards it to the Merchant Server (step 11) where
the AC will be checked against the PI.
Oﬄine approval. If the transaction is approved oﬄine, the AC generated
by the card is a TC, which is sent to the Cardholder System from where it
is forwarded to the Merchant Server (steps 10/11). The TC will be held with
the PI and acts analogously to the receipt in a conventional POS system. The
Merchant Server can later send a batch of TCs, with the corresponding PIs, to
the Acquirer to capture the payments. The issuer will verify the MAC in the
TC and compare the information in the TC with that in the PI. If they match,
the payment is accepted and processed.
Oﬄine decline. If the transaction is declined oﬄine, the AC generated by
the card is an AAC which is sent to the Cardholder System, where it will be
forwarded to the Merchant Server (steps 10/11). The merchant can store the
AAC with the PI for management purposes, and the transaction now ends.
Online processing. If the IC card decides that online authorisation is needed,
then the AC generated by the card is an ARQC which is forwarded to the Mer-
chant Server via the Cardholder System (steps 10/11). The Merchant Server
then sends the ARQC with the PI to the Acquirer and thence to the issuer
(step 12). The issuer responds to the ARQC with an ARPC (step 13). The
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Script Processing may also now be performed by the issuer to send command
scripts to the IC card (steps 14/15). The transaction will be accepted or de-
clined according to the ARPC. If it is accepted, the IC card generates a TC
(step 16) and the process previously described under oﬄine approval is per-
formed. Similarly, if the transaction is declined, the IC card generates an AAC
(step 16). The TC or AAC is then forwarded to the Merchant Server (step 17)
and the transaction processing ends.
5.3.3 Security services
We now describe how the desired security services are provided in the proposed
protocol.
5.3.3.1 Authentication
Cardholder and IC card authentication are provided in the same way as in ‘stan-
dard’ EMV. Cardholder authentication is based on knowledge of a PIN. IC card
authentication uses static and dynamic data authentication. Merchant Server
authentication, however, is not provided by the protocol. However, Merchant
Server authentication is provided via the SSL/TLS session used to protect the
Internet link.
5.3.3.2 Confidentiality and integrity
Although the entered PIN is not encrypted, its confidentiality and integrity are
protected since it never leaves the environment over which the cardholder has
control. If, however, PIN verification needs to be online, the entered PIN will
be encrypted using a secret encipherment key shared between the IC card and
the issuer. The PIN can also be encrypted between the PIN pad and the IC
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card using the IC card’s public key.
AC integrity is guaranteed by the use of MACs, as in the EMV specifications.
Nevertheless, confidentiality of the AC is not provided by the protocol. However,
confidentiality for the AC when it is transmitted over the Internet is provided
by the use of SSL/TLS.
5.3.3.3 Non-repudiation
A measure of Cardholder non-repudiation is provided by the TC. The existence
of a valid TC provides evidence that the genuine cardholder has implicitly con-
sented, and hence the cardholder has consented to the transaction by entering
his/her PIN. By contrast, merchant non-repudiation is not provided, although
the value of such a service is unclear.
5.4 Threat analysis
In the protocol, there are five locations where the transaction data is at risk.
These are the Cardholder System, the card reader, the link between the two,
the Internet link between Cardholder System and Merchant Server, and the
Merchant Server. Threats to the Internet link are addressed since we assume the
use of SSL/TLS to protect the link. Threats to the Merchant Server-Acquirer
link are outside the scope of this thesis, since such threats apply equally to
conventional use of an EMV card, and we only consider here threats introduced
by ‘remote EMV’.
Therefore we divide our threat analysis into two parts, namely threats to the
cardholder environment, and threats at the Merchant Server. In each case, the
possible types of transaction data which may be at risk are considered, along
with the entities which may pose a threat. There are six types of transaction
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data that need to be examined, namely the Static Application Data (SAD),
PI, IAC, SIC(DAD), PIN, and four ACs. Note, however, that integrity threats
to SIC(DAD) and the four ACs are minimal since they are cryptographically
protected using ‘standard’ EMV techniques. We thus focus most of our attention
on the SAD, PI, IAC, and PIN.
5.4.1 Threats to the cardholder environment
The integrity of the Cardholder System may be at risk, since it is likely to be
PC-based and is also connected to the Internet. There are thus many threats
to its integrity, including the possible presence of malicious code. Of course,
an integrity check of the Cardholder System could, in theory, be performed
by the IC card at the start of the process — however, not only would this
require modifications to the functionality of the EMV card (and hence would
not really be practical), but there is also a limit to the degree to which an
entity, no matter how powerful, can check the integrity of the system to which
it is connected. More importantly, any PC system used to conduct e-commerce
could be compromised, and this could put at risk both the confidentiality of the
card details and the integrity of any transactions. There is no obvious solution
to this problem, although the use of trusted components (e.g. a trusted card
reader, as discussed in Section 5.5) may be of some help. For the purposes
of this chapter we assume that the cardholder is responsible for ensuring the
correct operation of the Cardholder System, and we only consider threats to the
Cardholder System arising from the cardholder him/herself.
We refer to the combination of Cardholder System, card reader, and link be-
tween the two, as the cardholder environment. The SAD, PI, IAC, SIC(DAD),
PIN, and four ACs pass through this environment. However, cardholder threats
to the SAD, IAC, SIC(DAD), and PIN are not serious since the cardholder has
the card and knows the PIN.
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A malicious cardholder can modify the PI to make the Cardholder System
send a smaller transaction value to the card than specified by the Merchant
Server. However, the fraud will be detected as soon as the SIC(DAD) arrives
and is verified at the Merchant Server. As a result, modifying the PI yields little
to the cardholder. More seriously, because the Merchant Server does not have
the MAC key necessary to verify the ACs, the Merchant Server cannot determine
if the ACs received are authentic. Modifying the ARQC and the ARPC will
yield no gain since they are sent online to the issuer, and altering the AAC is also
unattractive for the cardholder because it yields nothing financially. However,
an unscrupulous cardholder can modify or replace an oﬄine-approved TC sent
from the IC card, thereby causing the payment capture to fail at a later stage.
However, this risk also exists in the conventional EMV environment. Special
equipment could be used to interfere with the communications between the POS
terminal and the IC card. As in our scheme, the equipment could replace or
modify the TC so that the MAC becomes invalid. A possible way to address
this threat is to delay dynamic data authentication until after the TC has been
generated, and then include the TC in the DAD signed by the card. The
Merchant Server can verify the card public key and signature, using the issuer
public key, thereby guaranteeing the authenticity of the TC. Including the TC
in the DAD should not be a problem in the future, since such a process is
supported by the latest version of the EMV specifications (see Section 6.6 of
[14]) using what is known as Combined Data Authentication.
5.4.2 Threats at the Merchant Server
The transaction data available at the Merchant Server are the SAD, IAC, PI,
and the ACs. The Merchant Server is either the legitimate recipient or the
generator of the four types of data. There is thus no serious threat to data
confidentiality. There is also no obvious financial gain for the merchant from
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breaching data integrity. The ARQC and the ARPC will be sent online to
the issuer, and the TC and the PI will also be checked by the issuer. If any
modifications are made, the payment capture or authorisation process will fail.
It is also clear that there is no point in modifying the SAD or the IAC since
doing so will simply interrupt the transaction process.
5.5 Use of trusted card readers
The proposed protocol may be used in conjunction with ‘trusted’ card readers,
i.e. those with a simple user interface such as a PIN pad and small display.
How a cardholder obtains such a card reader is outside the scope of this thesis.
However, one possibility is that it could be distributed by card issuing banks to
their customers.
5.5.1 System architecture
If a trusted card reader is used in the proposed protocol, the system architecture
will remain similar to that described in Section 5.3.1. However, note that here
we suppose that the card reader has a PIN pad and a display. A trusted card
reader may look like one of the examples shown in Figure 5.4.
In the protocol, the special purpose software required for the Cardholder
System can be made simpler, since most of its tasks are now performed by the
card reader and the Merchant Server. The remaining task of the Cardholder
System is only to forward messages between the card reader and the Merchant
Server. On the other hand, to perform the added tasks, the card reader and the
Merchant Server now need different special purpose software from that described
in Section 5.3.1.
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Figure 5.4: Possible trusted card readers
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5.5.2 Transaction process
The transaction processing procedure is similar to that described in Sec-
tion 5.3.2. Figure 5.5 shows the modified transaction processing procedure in
the protocol for the case where a ‘trusted’ card reader is used.
As described in Section 5.3.2.1, the transaction begins with the static data
authentication process. After successful static data authentication, the Mer-
chant Server generates the IAC and PI and sends the two data items to the
Cardholder System which in turn forwards them to the card reader (step 2).
The card reader now displays the purchase information to the cardholder, in-
stead of sending it to the Cardholder System. The IC card then computes
and sends the signature SIC(DAD) along with its public key certificate to the
Merchant Server via the Cardholder System (step 3). After successful card
authentication, Processing Restrictions (step 4) is performed.
The cardholder verification process is one of the main differences between
the previously described protocol and this modified protocol. Instead of using
the Cardholder System, the cardholder is now required to enter his/her PIN
via the PIN pad of the card reader (step 6). The PIN is then verified by the
IC card. After successful cardholder verification, the Merchant Server (not the
Cardholder System) performs Terminal Risk Management and Terminal Action
Analysis, generates and sends an AC Command to the card reader (step 7).
The rest of the procedure remains the same as that described in Section 5.3.2.
5.5.3 Threat analysis
If a trusted card reader is used, it is possible for the cardholder to verify the value
of the transaction being authorised by the card by checking the amount displayed
by the card reader. This therefore reduces the trust in the cardholder PC.
Moreover, the cardholder can prevent the authorisation of multiple transactions
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Cardholder   IC card      PC Merchant Server       Acquirer
and Card Reader
   1. Static Data Authentication
  2. IAC || PI
-display the purchase
 information(PI)to the cardholder
    3. SIC(DAD) || CertIC
-verify the certificate,
 the public key and the
 signature
  4. Processing Restrictions
    5. PIN Request
6. PIN
-PIN verification
 process
-if PIN verification
 response is success, perform
 Risk Management. Otherwise, end.
      7. AC Command
  -perform card action analysis
  -generate Application
    Cryptogram
        8. TC/AAC/ARQC
-check TC/AAC/ARQC against PI
-if TC/AAC is sent,
 store it with PI
 and the protocol ends.
-if ARQC is sent,
 send message 9.
      9. ARQC||PI
   10. ARPC, (Script Process)
   11. TC/AAC
-store TC/AAC with PI and end.
Figure 5.5: Transaction flow for remote EMV with secure card reader
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by a manipulated cardholder PC. Using a trusted card reader also reduces the
risk of malicious code spying on information entered via the user PC. The use of
a trusted card reader therefore significantly reduces the necessary level of trust
in the Cardholder System, and hence increases cardholder protection.
The fact that the Cardholder System software can be made much simpler also
reduce the risks from malicious code present in the software, since it will be much
easier to check the integrity of the program. However, as stated in Section 5.4,
there is a limit to the degree to which the card reader and/or the IC card can
check the integrity of the Cardholder System. For example, malicious code may
modify the software in such a way that it replays the same checksum or issuer
signature on the software. Nevertheless, there are ways to effectively check the
integrity of a program using cryptographic techniques. These include the use of
a MAC with ‘random’ information, such as that sent in the IAC, as key material.
This prevents malicious code from replaying the integrity checksum. However,
even if a MAC is generated on the concatenation of the code and a random
value, this does not completely prevent malicious modification of code. It is
still possible for the attacker to retain a copy of the unmodified code, and use
it to compute the MAC which will clearly pass the MAC verification. Another
disadvantage of introducing a cryptographic checksum is that the transaction
process becomes more complex and hence loses the significant advantage of using
the ‘standard’ EMV card capability.
5.6 Advantages and disadvantages
Using EMV cards to make a remote payment may compromise certain EMV se-
curity elements. A POS system has the advantage of face-to-face interactions as
well as use of a tamper-resistant POS terminal. By contrast, Internet transac-
tions involve no face-to-face interactions, and the terminal, here a combination
of card reader, Cardholder System and Merchant Server, is clearly not tamper-
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resistant. Indeed, in the proposed scheme, certain data which would be sent via
internal communications in an EMV POS terminal are sent via the Internet.
The proposed protocol, however, enhances the security of existing Internet
payment methods, which typically rely only on SSL/TLS for transaction secu-
rity. There are known security risks with such an approach, including lack of
cardholder authentication [82]. Our scheme provides cardholder authentication
by using EMV PIN verification. The PIN is also associated with the IC card
such that without the correct PIN no transaction can be made.
A major advantage of the scheme is that it uses existing technologies. This
includes the SSL/TLS protocol, the EMV PKI established by the card brands
and the issuers, and the EMV cards themselves. By comparison with the Mas-
terCard SPA or Visa 3-D Secure scheme [90, 91], the proposed scheme offers the
same security services, namely cardholder authentication and the associated
non-repudiation. However, SPA and 3-D Secure both require real-time interac-
tions with the issuer to perform cardholder authentication. By contrast, in the
remote EMV scheme, the IC card can make decisions oﬄine, thereby reducing
communications overheads.
Using an IC card remotely does require special software (e.g. an applet) to
be installed in the cardholder PC. An IC card reader, whether ‘trusted’ or not,
is also needed. Nevertheless, use of the proposed scheme is ‘light’ compared to
the SET initialisation process.
The protocol relies on Cardholder System integrity, since the Cardholder
System could be modified by a malicious cardholder to send a bogus TC, or
by an unscrupulous merchant to display different payment information to the
cardholder from that sent to the IC card. The Cardholder System could also
be compromised by viruses and trojan horses. Such threats, however can be
significantly reduced by the use of ‘trusted’ card reader, and will in any case
always exist for PC-based e-commerce solutions. The user must simply be made
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aware of these threats.
Another weakness of the proposed protocol may be that confidentiality of the
card details is not provided; the Cryptograms are transmitted over the Internet
and hence may be intercepted. However, as described above, a secure channel,
e.g. as provided by SSL/TLS, can be used in combination with the protocol to
protect the transaction data en route between the Cardholder System and Mer-
chant Server. Moreover, if the proposed protocol is used, it requires the presence
of the IC card to make a transaction. Thus, if this protocol is universally used
then knowledge of the card details becomes less useful.
5.7 Related work
The most closely related work is probably the scheme described in an annex
to Book 3 of the EMV 2000 specifications [15]. This scheme combines SET
with EMV-compliant IC cards to conduct Internet transactions. However, as
discussed in Section 3.3.2, there remain serious obstacles to the use of SET.
Another related proposal is that described in a MasterCard white paper [63].
This white paper describes the use of the EMV card infrastructure in an au-
thentication application. The protocol can be used to authenticate the presence
of the cardholder in remote environments such as the Internet. Although the
Mastercard protocol is very similar to our protocol in the way that they both
use an EMV card, the former aims to provide only an authentication service.
The protocol proposed in this chapter provides, in addition to cardholder au-
thentication, payment authorisation.
GeldKarte [52] is an electronic cash card developed by the German banking
industry. GeldKarte applications have also been extended to Internet uses,
allowing the cardholder to use the value in the card to buy things from the
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Internet as well as to enhance the security of Internet transactions. However
GeldKarte is clearly different from the proposed protocol since it is an electronic
cash scheme.
5.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have proposed a way to use an EMV-compliant IC card
for e-commerce transactions. In the scheme, a user card reader and PC (the
Cardholder System) together with the Merchant Server collectively take the role
of the EMV Merchant Terminal. Most of the transaction procedures are similar
to those in the EMV specification.
The use of ‘trusted’ card readers in conjunction with the proposed protocol
is also examined in this chapter. If a trusted card reader is used, then confiden-
tiality protection for the PIN can be enhanced. Moreover, the simpler software
required in the Cardholder System makes it easier to perform an integrity check.
Although some of the EMV security requirements are affected, the proposed
scheme is a step towards enhancing existing SSL/TLS based electronic transac-
tion processing.
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6. GSM and E-Commerce
The aim of this chapter is to propose two different ways of using the GSM
security services to enhance the security of electronic transactions, as well as to
increase the user’s mobility when making an Internet transaction.
An overview of GSM security services which are particularly relevant to the
proposed protocols is given in Section 6.2. The first protocol, in which the GSM
subscriber identity authentication service is utilised, is described in Section 6.3,
followed by a threat analysis, and a discussion of advantages and disadvantages.
A description of the second protocol is given in Section 6.4, which is again
followed by a threat analysis, and a review of advantages and disadvantages.
In Section 6.4.6, the two proposed protocols are then compared. Related work
is examined in Section 6.5, followed by a description of how the protocols can
be extended to make use of the security features of UMTS instead of GSM
(Section 6.6). The last section concludes the chapter.
It is important to note that much of the material in this chapter has previ-
ously been described in [57, 59].
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6.1 Introduction
As stated in Section 4.3.3, SSL/TLS does not obligate client authentication.
This, in turn, makes possible certain frauds during Internet payment processing.
To provide client authentication using SSL/TLS, the user must first establish an
asymmetric key pair. He/she will also need a secure place to store the private
part of the key. Usually the key is stored in the user PC (password protected).
As a result, the user has to use the particular machine every time a payment
is to be made. Although a smart card could be employed to store the key and
enhance mobility, not many user PCs are equipped with smart card readers.
Hence, and as discussed previously, making use of SSL client authentication is
not really a viable proposition for most users.
By contrast, very large numbers of users across the world now possess a GSM
mobile phone. Therefore, in this chapter we propose two payment protocols
which utilise the security services provided in the GSM air interface to support
user authentication. The first protocol only provides user authentication while
the second protocol also achieves card details’ confidentiality.
The two protocols indirectly reduce the threat posed by the storage of un-
encrypted card numbers in a merchant server by reducing the value of stolen
card numbers to a fraudster. This is achieved by requiring the user to possess
both a debit/credit card and a GSM Mobile Station (MS), i.e. a GSM Mobile
Equipment (ME) and a GSM Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), which must
be registered under the same name as appears on the card. In short, the two
protocols make use of MS portability and the GSM security mechanisms to pro-
vide user authentication and data confidentiality in a way that also supports
user mobility.
In this chapter, an overview of GSM security is first provided followed by
specifications of the two proposed protocols. A threat analysis, and the advan-
93
6. GSM and E-Commerce
tages and disadvantages of each scheme are subsequently given, followed by a
comparison of the two proposed protocols. A discussion of related work and a
possible extension of the protocols to make use of the UMTS security features
are also given.
6.2 An overview of GSM security
In this section, we describe how security services are provided in the GSM
air interface protocol. GSM provides three main security services for the air
interface, namely subscriber identity confidentiality, subscriber identity authen-
tication, and data confidentiality. However, we will describe only the two latter
security services, since they are the ones exploited in the protocols proposed
here. Details of the first security service, together with other details of GSM
security can be found in a number of places, e.g. [17, 18, 67, 88, 92].
6.2.1 Subscriber identity authentication
Within every SIM there exists a long-term secret key, Ki, which is unique and
known only to the SIM and Authentication Centre (AuC) of the home network
operator of the subscriber. The home network operator is the organisation with
whom the subscriber has a contractual arrangement for the provision of service,
and which the subscriber pays for this service.
To authenticate a SIM, the visited network needs a triplet which consists of
a random number (RAND), the expected response (XRES), and a secret cipher
key (Kc). The (RAND, XRES) pair enables the network to verify the authentic-
ity of the SIM without having the key Ki, while Kc is used for encryption (see
Section 6.2.2). To compute a triplet, the AuC generates a RAND and passes it
with Ki as parameters to algorithms A3 and A8, which are specific to a network
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operator. The outputs of A3 and A8 are XRES and Kc respectively.
The AuC generates triplets as required, and passes them to whichever net-
work needs them. When a SIM is requested to authenticate itself to a network,
a RAND from a triplet provided by the SIM’s home network is sent from the
network to the SIM. Since the SIM is equipped with the function A3 and the
secret key Ki, it can generate the Signed Response (SRES) using RAND and
Ki as inputs. The SIM then sends the SRES to the network where the SRES is
compared with the XRES. If they match, SIM verification is successful.
6.2.2 Data confidentiality
In GSM, the encryption of the data exchanged between the mobile phone and
the base station is based on the secret session key Kc. As described in Sec-
tion 6.2.1, the AuC generates a triplet, one element of which is Kc. The key is
made available to the visited network by the subscriber’s home network’s Au-
thentication Centre (AuC). The key Kc is computed within the SIM and made
available to its host mobile telephone for data encryption (all data encryption
is performed externally to the SIM).
A stream cipher algorithm A5 is used to encrypt the data sent across the
radio path. Unlike A3 and A8, the algorithm A5 is not network specific but is
defined in the GSM standards. In [18], several versions of A5 are specified, the
choice of which can be negotiated between the SIM and the network.
6.3 Using GSM authentication for e-commerce
In this section, an e-commerce user authentication protocol which makes use
of the GSM authentication service is described. In the proposed scheme, a
consumer is required to have a GSM Mobile Equipment and a SIM registered
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under the name that appears on the debit/credit card. It is important to note
that the protocol does not need the SIM to be modified in any way. However,
the ME does need to have the means to take a RAND value from a PC, pass it
to the SIM, and pass the SRES value from the SIM back to the PC.
In this section, the system architecture for this scheme is first described,
followed by the transaction processing procedure.
6.3.1 System architecture
Three main system components are involved in our payment protocol. These
are a User System, a merchant server, and an AuC. The system architecture is
shown in Figure 6.1.
  
 TLS protected      Internet or
        special purpose     link
  User System
 Cable,Infrared
             TLS    TLS protected
  or Bluetooth              Internet link
Authentication
Centre
Mobile
Station
PC
Merchant
Server
 SIM
Figure 6.1: System architecture — GSM-based cardholder authentication.
6.3.1.1 User System
The User System consists of a GSM Mobile Station (MS), i.e. a GSM Mobile
Equipment (ME) and a GSM Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), and a PC.
The MS (in fact the SIM) is responsible for outputting the SRES. Therefore,
although an ME is needed to interact with the SIM, the protocol can work
without an ME if there is an alternative means for the SIM to communicate
with the user PC. The means of communication used between the MS and
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the user PC is not specified here. However, Infrared, a cable, or Bluetooth1
could be employed for the purpose (such means of communication are becoming
commonplace as mobile devices are increasingly being used for data transfer).
In a recent version of the SIM Toolkit (U-SIM Application Toolkit) [93], there
exists a command called ‘AT command’ which enables a U-SIM to tell an ME to
open an infrared or bluetooth channel. The U-SIM Application Toolkit (USAT),
therefore, could be used to implement the proposed protocol.
In the remainder of Section 6.3, the scheme is described in the context of a
User System in which the PC provides the main platform for conducting user
e-commerce, and the MS simply acts to support user authentication. However,
in environments where the MS has sophisticated user interfaces and processing
capabilities, e.g. a WAP device, the MS could take on some or all of the PC’s
tasks.
6.3.1.2 Merchant server and Authentication Centre
The merchant server is the component that interacts with the User System to
support electronic transactions. The communication link between the Merchant
Server and Cardholder System is the Internet. In our scheme, SSL/TLS is as-
sumed to be used to provide merchant server authentication, and confidentiality
and integrity for the information transmitted over this link. Indeed, the whole
purpose of the scheme described here is to enhance the security provided by
SSL/TLS rather than seeking to design a completely new and comprehensive
security system. This is based on the belief that security for e-commerce must
be introduced in ways which minimise the overheads for all parties, and in par-
ticular for the e-consumer.
The merchant server also interacts with the AuC in order to retrieve values
required in the user authentication process. The AuC is required to supply the
1http://www.bluetooth.com
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merchant server with values necessary for the GSM identity authentication pro-
cess. It takes inputs from the merchant server and produces the values used for
identity authentication. The choice of the communication link between the two
is again not an issue here. However, it could be an SSL/TLS protected Internet
session or a special purpose link provided by the mobile network operator.
As discussed in Section 6.3.3, we suppose that the integrity and confidential-
ity of the merchant server/AuC link is protected in some way, e.g. via encryption
and MACs or signatures; however, the means by which this is achieved is outside
the scope of the discussion here.
6.3.2 Transaction processing
The proposed payment protocol starts after a consumer has decided to make a
payment. The decision about which purchase to make is outside the scope of
this thesis — we simply assume that the consumer and the merchant wish to
perform a specified transaction.
The consumer first fills in a typical Internet purchase form using the PC.
In this protocol however, the form is required to contain a field for a mobile
phone number. Upon receipt of the form, the merchant server extracts the
mobile number from the form and the identity authentication process begins.
The procedure is illustrated in Figure 6.2.
The merchant server first sends the consumer’s mobile number to the AuC in
order to retrieve three values: a random number (RAND), an expected response
(XRES), and the subscriber name. This corresponds to message 1 in the figure.
Upon receipt of the merchant server request, the AuC generates the (RAND,
XRES) pair using the keyKi of the requested mobile number with algorithm A3.
It then sends the (RAND, XRES) pair, along with the name of the subscriber,
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Figure 6.2: GSM-e-commerce identity authentication process.
to the merchant server, as shown in message 2 in the figure. Upon receipt
of message 2, the merchant server first compares the name of the cardholder
with the subscriber name received from the AuC. If they match, the RAND
will be sent to the PC as in message 3 of the figure. Otherwise, the identity
authentication process fails and the protocol ends.
After having received the RAND, the user PC forwards it to the ME. The
ME then sends the RAND value to the SIM, just as it would if the RAND was
sent via the radio interface by a GSM base station. The SIM now generates an
SRES using the received RAND and its stored Ki as inputs to algorithm A3.
The SIM then passes the generated SRES back to the ME, again just as it would
normally (i.e. the SIM is not required to have any special functionality). The
ME then sends the SRES to the PC, which forwards the value to the merchant
server (message 4). At the merchant server, the SRES is compared with the
XRES. If they match, the consumer is deemed to have been authenticated.
The Internet transaction processing may now continue.
6.3.3 Threat analysis
In this section, we consider threats to the proposed protocol. The threats can
be divided into three categories: threats to the User System, threats to the two
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communications links (user system/merchant server and merchant server/AuC),
and threats in the merchant server and the AuC.
6.3.3.1 Threats in the User System
As stated previously, the User System consists of a user PC and an MS. Since
this protocol does not require the user PC to contain sensitive information, the
threats arising from the PC are minimal. Although information that passes via
the PC can be cached, this information is not confidential. A debit/credit card
number can be cached and compromised but the protocol still requires a cor-
responding SIM to make an electronic transaction. In any event, such a threat
would exist in any PC-based e-commerce protocol. The issue of protecting the
user PC against threats to its integrity is addressed in more detail in Chapter 7.
Threats to the MS are divided into two scenarios, depending on the amount
of information an attacker has. Clearly, if he/she has neither the SIM nor the
card details, a transaction cannot be made and hence there is no threat. It
should also be clear that if the attacker has both a complete set of card details
and a stolen SIM for the cardholder, then the system cannot prevent an attack
— unless, of course, the SIM has been reported stolen and blacklisted by the
network, or the SIM has been PIN protected by its owner. We therefore consider
the two main ‘intermediate’ scenarios.
Scenario 1 : Attacker has a stolen SIM without the corresponding card de-
tails.
In this scenario, if an attacker has stolen a SIM and the subscriber name of
the stolen SIM is unknown, although a valid SRES can be generated, he/she
will not be able to create a matched cardholder name necessary to pass the
authentication process.
By contrast, if the subscriber name is known to the attacker, it is possible
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to complete the protocol successfully using a fabricated set of cardholder details
as long as the fabricated details include a cardholder name corresponding to the
subscriber name. However, the fraud will become clear soon after the merchant
tries to charge the card. In the most typical case for an e-commerce transaction,
the merchant will try to charge the specified payment card before the goods are
dispatched. In such a case, the threat is therefore small. Nevertheless, the
threat can be more serious if the goods are, for example, information or music
which will be delivered instantly via the Internet. However, even in this case, the
threat can be avoided if, as is often the case, the merchant server seeks payment
authorisation before authorising delivery of the goods. If the card details are
fabricated then the card issuer will, of course, reject the payment.
A possible way to prevent such attacks is for the SIM to be PIN-protected.
It is also important that the PIN is never entered on an untrusted device.
Scenario 2 : Attacker has stolen card details without the corresponding SIM.
If an attacker has only card details, without the SIM, it will not be possible
to generate a valid SRES. This threat is therefore addressed by the scheme
described above.
Thus, to be successful, an attack on the user system needs both the victim’s
SIM and the corresponding debit/credit card details to complete a fraudulent
transaction.
6.3.3.2 Threats to the communications links
If any of the information transferred across either of the links is modified, then
the protocol will fail. Hence, a theoretical denial of service attack exists, al-
though there are many simpler ways to prevent the completion of a transaction.
We now consider other threats arising to the two links.
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Threats on the PC/merchant server link : The confidentiality and integrity
issues apply to the payment information transferred across this link. However,
as stated in Section 6.3.1, we assume that the Internet link between the PC
and merchant server is protected using SSL/TLS throughout the transaction
procedure.
Note that a possible alternative to the protocol described here would be to
use GSM authentication to enhance the security of the SSL/TLS initialisation
process. However, if such an approach is followed, it is not clear how to achieve
the desired link between the GSM subscriber name and the cardholder name.
Threats on the merchant server/AuC link : Threats on this link can be fur-
ther divided into two types, namely integrity threats and confidentiality threats.
• Integrity threats: There are a number of ways in which an attacker could
manipulate this link in order to persuade the merchant server to accept
an impostor. Perhaps the simplest method would involve the attacker
using an arbitrary (valid) SIM and ME in combination with stolen card
details (which, of course, will not match the GSM subscription name).
In message 2 the AuC will provide a valid RAND and XRES for the
attacker’s SIM, and will return the name associated with the attacker’s
GSM subscription. An active attacker could change this name to the
name associated with the stolen card details, and the merchant server will
accept message 2. The remainder of the protocol will complete correctly,
and the account for which the details were stolen will be charged for the
transaction.
An alternative attack, again using stolen card details, does not require the
attacker to have a valid SIM at all. The attacker supplies an arbitrary
(but valid) GSM number with the stolen card details. In message 2, the
AuC will send a (RAND, XRES) pair for the arbitrarily chosen GSM
subscription, along with the subscriber name. The active attacker can then
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replace the contents of message 2 with the name for the stolen card details,
along with an arbitrary (RAND, XRES) pair. The merchant server will
accept message 2 because the names match, and will send the manipulated
RAND to the attacker in message 3. The attacker simply returns the
manipulated XRES value in message 4, and again the attack will succeed.
The existence of these attacks means that it is vital that the integrity of
the link between AuC and merchant server is protected.
• Confidentiality threats: There are also a number of serious confidentiality
threats. First note that a passive eavesdropper can perform an attack
similar to the second integrity attack described above. Suppose an attacker
has a set of stolen card details and also knows the GSM number for the
owner of the stolen card details. The attacker initiates the protocol using
the stolen card details and the known GSM number. Message 2 will be
accepted by the Merchant server because the GSM number belongs to the
valid cardholder. However, if the attacker can intercept message 2, then
the XRES value can be obtained. The attacker then simply inserts this
value into message 4 and the protocol will complete successfully.
Also note that, in the absence of integrity and confidentiality, the merchant
server/AuC protocol could also be used to find the subscriber name correspond-
ing to any GSM number. This would be a significant breach of GSM subscriber
confidentiality.
These attacks mean that it is important to provide both confidentiality and
integrity for this link, and this is why we assume throughout this section that
this link is both confidentiality and integrity protected.
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6.3.3.3 Threats in the merchant server and the AuC
Since the merchant server is responsible for the identity authentication process,
in particular the comparison of names and XRES with SRES, it is important
to protect the server against any attack which might cause the protocol to be
bypassed.
Over and above the integrity of the user authentication process, the mer-
chant server will have access to large volumes of potentially sensitive subscriber
information. As part of the user authentication process, the merchant server re-
trieves from the AuC the account holder name for any GSM telephone number.
Not only is this a sensitive privacy issue, but requiring the AuC to supply such
information may potentially be in breach of its licence and/or data privacy leg-
islation. It is therefore vital that the merchant server be protected and trusted
so that this information cannot be abused.
One way of mitigating this security issue is to make a slight modification
to the protocol of Section 6.3.2. In the revised protocol, shown in Figure 6.3,
in message 1 the merchant server supplies the cardholder name as well as the
mobile number. The AuC is then required to compare the name supplied in
message 1 with the name it has associated with the GSM number. If they do
not match the protocol should not proceed. If they do match, in message 2 the
AuC simply provides a (RAND, XRES) pair.
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Figure 6.3: Revised protocol.
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Another way to reduce this threat is for the merchant server to create and
send a RAND to the User System and thence the SIM. Upon the receipt of the
RAND, the SIM generates the SRES and sends it to the merchant server via
the user PC. The merchant server subsequently sends the cardholder’s name,
his/her mobile number, the RAND, and the SRES to the AuC to verify. The
protocol is shown in Figure 6.4.
     4. Yes/No
3. Mobile number, Name, RAND, SRES
 User System
      1. RAND
   
2. SRES
Mobile
Station
PC Merchant
Server
Authentication
Centre
Figure 6.4: Another revised protocol.
These modified protocols have the advantage that the AuC retains control of
sensitive subscriber information. However, it has the disadvantage of requiring
additional processing by the AuC.
If the integrity of the AuC could be compromised, then there are possible
attacks to the security of the user authentication process. However, in such
an event there are also many other serious attacks to the security of the GSM
network itself, and so we assume that the AuC is well-protected.
6.3.4 Advantages and disadvantages
In this section, the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed protocol are
considered.
105
6. GSM and E-Commerce
6.3.4.1 Advantages
The following advantages arise from the proposed use of GSM-based user au-
thentication.
1. The protocol provides user authentication based on GSM subscriber au-
thentication. As a result, stolen credit card details cannot be used to
launch a successful e-commerce transaction.
2. Since stolen credit card details cannot be used to launch a successful e-
commerce transaction, the threat arising from the storage of unencrypted
credit card numbers in merchant servers is accordingly reduced.
3. The protocol supports user mobility. The user authentication process
requires only the correct software to be loaded on the PC, and for there to
exist a means to connect the MS to the PC. In the authentication process,
the PC is simply responsible for forwarding messages between the MS and
the merchant server. Moreover, since the protocol does not involve storing
any secrets on the PC, the risks in using untrusted PCs are minimised.
4. The protocol can work with a ‘standard’ GSM SIM. It simply requires an
appropriately equipped ME and a user PC.
5. From the merchant point of view, the protocol will reduce the number
of fraudulent transactions and hence lessen the cost of ‘card-not-present’
chargebacks.
6.3.4.2 Disadvantages
The following disadvantages arise from use of the proposed GSM-based user
authentication.
1. Prior agreement is required between the merchant and the mobile phone
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service provider to support the protocol between the AuC and the mer-
chant server. To avoid the need for many individual arrangements between
merchants and mobile network operators, a Trusted Third Party (TTP)
could be introduced to act as a ‘broker’ between the two parties. This bro-
ker could simply route messages between merchant servers and the AuC.
In such a scenario, merchant servers and mobile network operators would
only need to have a contractual agreement with the broker. One possible
candidate for the broker would be the card brand.
2. Since it is possible for the merchants to collect subscriber identity infor-
mation and phone numbers, the merchants must be trusted not to abuse
such information.
3. Merchants may be charged for the AuC services. This cost therefore has to
be weighed against the cost of ‘card-not-present’ chargebacks which may
vary from merchant to merchant. Of course, this is not a disadvantage for
the GSM network provider, who may find this a useful additional revenue
stream.
4. If the U-SIM Application Toolkit [93] is to be used, the proposed protocol
may require an ME and a SIM which support the functionality.
6.3.5 Summary
We have proposed a way in which GSM subscriber identity authentication can be
used to enhance e-commerce security. The protocol provides user authentication
and hence significantly reduces threats arising from misuse of misappropriated
card details. It therefore also indirectly reduces the risk of storing card details
in unencrypted form in merchant servers. The protocol works with a ‘standard’
GSM SIM and requires only an appropriate equipped Mobile Equipment and a
user PC. It therefore imposes minimal overheads on the user, thus increasing
the likelihood of successful use. The gains for the merchant in terms of reduced
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chargebacks also appear significant, and the possibility of an increased revenue
stream may also make the system attractive to the GSM operators.
6.4 Using GSM data encryption for e-commerce
In this section, we propose another protocol in which a consumer is again re-
quired to have a GSM Mobile Equipment (ME) and a SIM registered under the
name that appears on his/her debit/credit card. It is important to note that,
just like the previous scheme, the protocol does not need the SIM to be modified
in any way. However, the ME does need some special capabilities, as described
below.
In this section, the system architecture for this protocol is first described,
followed by the transaction processing procedure.
6.4.1 System architecture
Five main system components are involved in this payment protocol. These are
a User System, a merchant server, an acquirer, an issuer, and an AuC. The
system architecture is shown in Figure 6.5.
6.4.1.1 User System
The User System consists of a PC and a Mobile System (MS) which includes a
SIM and an ME. The MS (in fact the SIM) is responsible for outputting the
key Kc. Therefore, although an ME is needed to interact with the SIM, the
protocol can work without an ME if there is an alternative means for the SIM
to communicate with the user PC.
As for the protocol described in Section 6.3, the means of communication
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Figure 6.5: GSM-e-commerce payment system architecture.
used between the MS and the user PC is not specified here, and Infrared, a
cable, or Bluetooth2 could be employed.
In the remainder of Section 6.4, the scheme is described in the context of
a User System in which the PC provides the main platform for conducting
user e-commerce, and the MS acts to support the additional security functions.
However, in environments where the MS has sophisticated user interface and
processing capabilities, e.g. a WAP device, the MS could take on some or all of
the PC’s tasks.
Note that, in this protocol, we have proposed use of the key Kc for MAC
computation, where this key is normally used for data encryption. This is
a breach of key separation principles, although it may not be of significance
here. However, if this does give rise to security concerns, then the key could
be modified, e.g. passed through a one-way hash function, before being used to
compute a MAC.
2http://www.bluetooth.com
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6.4.1.2 Merchant server
The merchant server is the component that interacts with the User System
to support electronic transactions. The merchant server communicates with
the User System via the Internet. As for the scheme described in Section 6.3,
we assume that the link is protected by SSL/TLS to support merchant server
authentication and confidentiality and integrity protection for transferred data.
The merchant server also interacts with the acquirer to request a payment
authorisation. The choice of the communication link between the Merchant
Server and the Acquirer is not an issue here. However, it could be an SSL/TLS
protected Internet session, or a special purpose link provided by the acquirer.
As discussed in Section 6.4.3.2, we suppose that the integrity of the merchant
server/acquirer link is protected in some way, e.g. via MACs or signatures; how-
ever, the means by which this is achieved is outside the scope of the discussion
here.
6.4.1.3 Acquirer, issuer and Authentication Centre
The acquirer interacts with the issuer via the financial network to support trans-
action authorisation. However, in the proposed protocol, the issuer has the ad-
ditional roles of authenticating the cardholder, decrypting the card details, and
verifying the authenticity of the payment details and card details.
The issuer interacts with the AuC of the user’s home network in order to
retrieve values necessary to utilise the GSM security service. The choice of the
communication link between the issuer and the AuC is again outside the scope
of this thesis. However, it could be an SSL/TLS protected Internet session or a
special purpose link provided by the mobile network operator. As discussed in
Section 6.4.3.2, we assume that integrity and confidentiality protection for the
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issuer/AuC link are provided by some means.
The AuC is required to supply the issuer with the values normally used for
the GSM data confidentiality service.
6.4.2 Transaction processing
The proposed payment protocol starts after a consumer has decided to make a
payment. The consumer first fills in a typical Internet purchase form (excluding
card details). The form is also required to contain a field for a GSM phone
number. Upon receipt of the form, the merchant server initiates the protocol.
The procedure is illustrated in Figure 6.6. In this figure:
• RAND denotes a randomly generated 64-bit value,
• eK(M) denotes the encryption of message M (using symmetric encryp-
tion) with secret key K,
• Kc denotes a GSM cipher key used for encryption and MAC computation,
• ‘CD’ denotes card details entered by a consumer,
• X‖Y denotes the concatenation of data items X and Y ,
• MACK(M) denotes a MAC computed on message M using the key K,
• ‘PD’ denotes payment details that must be unique per transaction (e.g.
by containing a time stamp or a transaction ID),
• ‘MN’ is a GSM phone number, and
• ‘NAME’ is the subscriber name.
Upon receipt of the form, the merchant server generates and sends a random
number (RAND) and the payment details (PD) to the user PC, as shown in
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Figure 6.6: GSM-e-commerce payment protocol.
message 1. The user first checks the PD. If they are correct, the RAND is then
forwarded to the SIM, which in turn calculates the key Kc using the received
RAND and its stored key Ki as inputs to the key derivation algorithm shared
with the AuC. The SIM then passes the generated Kc back to the ME, just
as it would normally do in a GSM telephone (i.e. the SIM is not required to
have any special functionality). The ME then forwards the encryption key to
the user PC.
The user PC uses the key Kc to encrypt the card details entered by the
user. Examples of card details include the account number, expiry date, issue
number, and card verification code (CVC). In addition to the encryption, a
MAC is computed on a concatenation of the card details (CD) and the payment
details (PD), again using the key Kc, to protect the integrity of the information.
The PD must include (but is not limited to) the transaction value, date, and
merchant and transaction identification numbers. The enciphered information
and the MAC are then sent to the merchant server as shown in message 2 in
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the figure. Note that the encryption and MAC algorithms used here can be
issuer-specific, and need bear no relationship to the GSM algorithms. The only
requirement is that they are able to operate using a 64-bit GSM encryption key
Kc. Note that, to avoid key separation issues associated with use of the same
key for both encryption and MAC calculation, two different variants of the key
can be used for the two purposes e.g. as calculated by applying a hash-function
to the key. However, it is important to note that if one key can be derived from
another, then there is a potential for security vulnerabilities to be introduced;
hence this process needs to be designed with care.
The merchant server concatenates the received message with its own version
of PD, the RAND, and the user mobile phone number (MN) extracted from the
purchase form. The result is sent to the acquirer where it is forwarded to the
issuer as shown in messages 3 and 4 respectively.
In order to decrypt the encrypted CD and verify the MAC, the issuer needs
to contact the appropriate AuC to retrieve the key Kc. The issuer can either
determine the identity of the user’s home network (and hence the address of the
AuC) from the mobile number, or, if necessary, an identifier for the AuC can be
included in messages 2, 3 and 4. To enable the AuC to respond with the right
information, the issuer sends the mobile number and the RAND to request the
AuC to respond with the subscriber name and the cipher key. This corresponds
to message 5 in Figure 6.6. The AuC then responds with message 6 containing
the name and the key.
The issuer first decrypts the CD using the supplied key Kc. The issuer then
verifies the MAC to check the integrity of both the CD and the information
in PD, especially the transaction ID and merchant ID. The checking of PD is
necessary in order to prevent replay attacks (see Section 6.4.3.3). The checking
of the MAC is also important because, if the MAC is valid, then the user
must possess the valid SIM. If, in addition, the subscriber name matches the
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cardholder name, the cardholder is deemed to be the legitimate cardholder since
he/she possesses the SIM.
If all these processes are successful, the issuer can now proceed with the
‘normal’ transaction authorisation. Otherwise, the transaction is declined. The
decision of the issuer is reflected in the Authorisation Message (message 7)
which is then sent to the acquirer where it is forwarded to the merchant server
as shown in message 8. The protocol now ends.
Finally note that the protocol could be enhanced to ensure that a different
key is used for every transaction, even if the merchant fails to generate a new
RAND every time. The user system could generate its own random number,
RAND∗ say, and then derive a transaction key Kt as a one-way function of
RAND∗ and Kc. The key Kt can then be used instead of Kc in the protocol. In
this case however, the RAND∗ value must also be sent all the way to the AuC
to enable it to compute the same key Kt.
6.4.3 Threat analysis
In this section, we consider threats to this protocol. The threats can be divided
into four categories: threats to the User System, threats to the communica-
tions links (User System/merchant server, merchant server/acquirer, financial
network, and issuer/AuC), threats in the merchant server, and threats in the
acquirer, the issuer and the AuC.
6.4.3.1 Threats in the User System
As stated previously, the User System consists of a user PC and an MS. In this
section, threats to the MS are first described followed by threats to the user PC.
Threats to the Mobile System: If an attacker has stolen a SIM, although a
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valid cipher key Kc can be generated, he/she will not be able to complete a
transaction. The attacker still needs matching card details, and, even if stolen
card details are submitted, the fraud will be detected as soon as the transaction
is processed by the issuer. This is because the card details, in particular the
cardholder name, will not match the subscriber name sent by the AuC.
It is clear, however, that if the attacker has both a complete set of card
details and a stolen SIM for the cardholder, then the system cannot prevent an
attack — unless, of course, the SIM has been reported stolen and blacklisted by
the network.
If an attacker has stolen an ME without a SIM, he/she will not be able to
make a fraudulent payment, regardless of whether the corresponding card details
have been obtained. The ME is only responsible for forwarding information
between the SIM and the user PC. Without a SIM, a valid encryption key Kc
cannot be generated, and hence stealing an ME does not enable a successful
attack.
Threats to the user PC : Since the user PC does not contain sensitive in-
formation, the threats arising from the PC are minimal. Although information
that passes via the PC can be cached and attacked, this information is not
confidential. Debit/credit card details and the payment details can be cached
and compromised, but the protocol still requires a corresponding SIM to make
an electronic transaction. In any event, and as stated previously, any PC-based
e-commerce protocol involves the same risk of credit card number compromise
— for a more detailed analysis of the risks to a PC used for e-commerce see
Chapter 7. The cipher key can also be compromised, but since it is only a
transient key, and is a function of the RAND sent from the merchant server
for each transaction, compromising this key is not a threat unless an attacker
can impersonate a merchant server and force re-use of an old RAND value (and
hence an old key Kc). This can be prevented by requiring the user system to
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authenticate the merchant server and by the provision of integrity protection
for this link (see threats to the communication link).
If the fact that the PC has access to the card details is an issue, alternative
implementation scenarios are possible; in particular some of the functionality
currently allocated to the user PC could be transferred to the ME. For example,
if the ME has an appropriate user interface (and appropriate processing capa-
bilities), the card details could be entered into the ME and encrypted there,
denying the user PC any access to sensitive information.
6.4.3.2 Threats to the communication links
If any of the information transferred across any of the links is modified, then the
protocol will fail. Hence, a theoretical denial of service attack exists, although
there are many simpler ways to prevent the completion of a transaction. We
now consider other threats arising to the three links (User System/merchant
server, merchant server/acquirer, and issuer/AuC links). As stated above, the
issuer/acquirer communication link is assumed to be provided by the card brand.
Therefore, its security is assumed here.
Threats on the User System/merchant link : Threats on this link can be
divided into two types, namely integrity threats and confidentiality threats.
Each piece of information that is transmitted via this link, i.e. the RAND, the
card details (CD) and the payment details (PD), are now considered in turn
against both types of threat. However, threats to RAND will not be included,
since modifying or eavesdropping on this value do not enable attacks to be
launched. As a result, only threats to the card details and the payment details
will be considered.
• Integrity threats: It is important to ensure PD integrity in order to prevent
a malicious merchant from modifying it to gain financial advantage, such
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as charging the consumer more than is agreed upon. The PD is protected
against unauthorised modification using a MAC. Without the key Kc, it
is hard to generate a valid MAC for a modified PD.
Although modifying the CD does not yield any gain to an attacker, in our
protocol the information is included in the MAC computation to ensure its
integrity. It is worth noting that including the CD in the MAC has no im-
pact on the message length, and only creates a small extra computational
requirement.
As stated previously, there are threats arising from forcing re-use of an
old RAND for which the corresponding key Kc is known. In such a case,
the MAC can be modified and/or the CD compromised. Although the
likelihood of compromise of a keyKc by a malicious third party is relatively
small, if this is a genuine possibility then integrity protection for this
channel and merchant server authentication are required. This can be
achieved using a secure channel such as is provided by SSL/TLS.
• Confidentiality threats: It is essential to ensure the confidentiality of sen-
sitive information, i.e. the CD. In the protocol, this is provided by sym-
metric encryption.
Unlike the CD, the PD contains no sensitive information and hence does
not need protection against eavesdropping. Indeed, the PD is analogous
to a Point of Sale (POS) receipt which typically contains only the store
name, date, product description, transaction value and in some cases, the
last four digits of the payment card used. Therefore, confidentiality of
the PD is not provided. However, if both the PD and the MN can be
intercepted, then this may pose a privacy threat to the consumer.
However, as part of a purchase form, the consumer name along with other
contact information, in particular his/her mobile number, will be entered.
Consequently, confidentiality of the link is needed, otherwise it would be
possible for an attacker to passively eavesdrop on the link and obtain
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the (MN, consumer name) pair. Confidentiality protection for the User
System/merchant server link can be provided using SSL/TLS, just as is
normally the case for Internet transactions.
Threats on the merchant server/acquirer link : Threats to the card details
(CD), the RAND, and the PD are similar to those previously described. We now
consider the remaining information, i.e. the MN and the authorisation message,
in terms of confidentiality and integrity threats.
• Confidentiality threats: By monitoring the link, a list of mobile phone
numbers could be obtained. However, unlike the threat described in
the previous section, the consumer name is not transmitted on this link.
Therefore, having only a list of phone numbers without the corresponding
names is not likely to be very valuable.
An authorisation message may contain information similar to that in a
normal receipt. However, it is clear that it does not need to contain any
card details since such information is not necessary for the merchant to
complete the proposed payment protocol. Therefore, the authorisation
message is not sensitive and hence is not protected against eavesdropping
in this protocol.
• Integrity threats: Modifying the MN can only make the protocol fail and
does not yield gains to any party involved. On the other hand, the in-
tegrity of an authorisation message is important, since a malicious mer-
chant could modify the authorisation message from reject to authorise,
potentially causing a dispute. A way to prevent such a threat is to ensure
the integrity of the message, e.g. to require the acquirer to sign or MAC
protect message 8 in Figure 6.6 before sending it to the merchant.
Threats on the issuer/Authentication Centre link : Threats on this link can
again be divided into two types, namely integrity threats and confidentiality
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threats.
• Integrity threats: Modifying the RAND and the MN will only cause the
protocol to fail. However, if the integrity of information sent via this link
is not ensured, it would be possible for an attacker to manipulate this
link in order to bypass the cardholder authentication check. The attacker
could first use an arbitrary (but valid) GSM number and secret key to
encrypt the details of a stolen card (which, of course, will not match
the GSM subscription name and generate a MAC). In message 6 the
AuC will provide a valid Kc and the name associated with the attacker’s
GSM subscription. An active attacker could then replace the contents of
message 6 with the name associated with the stolen card details along
with the arbitrary secret key he/she used for the encryption and MAC
computation. The issuer will accept the cardholder authentication because
the MAC will verify correctly and the decryption will yield the expected
data. It will then proceed with the payment authorisation process. The
remainder of the protocol will complete correctly, and the account for
which the details were stolen will be charged for the transaction. The
existence of this attack means that it is vital that the integrity of the link
between AuC and issuer is protected.
• Confidentiality threats: As stated before, RAND is not sensitive and hence
confidentiality threats to the data transmitted on this link are minimal.
The key Kc is also not highly sensitive, although if the key can be inter-
cepted, and if an attacker also has access to the encrypted card details,
then it would be possible for them to decrypt the card details. However,
having only the card details is not sufficient to make an electronic payment
transaction in the proposed protocol.
Confidentiality threats also arise from the fact that the mobile number and
the corresponding subscriber name are sent across this link. Therefore,
in the absence of confidentiality protection on the issuer/AuC link, an
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eavesdropper could find the subscriber name corresponding to any GSM
number. This would be a significant breach of GSM subscriber confi-
dentiality. A list of matching names and mobile numbers could also be
compiled, representing a further potential privacy threat.
These attacks mean that it is important to provide both confidentiality and
integrity for this link, and this is why we assume throughout this section that
this link is both confidentiality and integrity protected.
6.4.3.3 Threats to the merchant server
The merchant server does not have access to some of the sensitive information,
in particular the CD, that it would in traditional electronic transactions, since
the information is encrypted with a key that the merchant server does not have.
The protocol therefore reduces the threat of storing unencrypted card details
at merchant servers, which is one of the major security threats when SSL/TLS
alone is used to protect electronic transactions.
The merchant server does have access to the RAND, PD, and the authenti-
cation message. However, this information is not sensitive. Therefore, there is
no serious threat to data confidentiality in this system component.
A malicious merchant could replay message 3 in Figure 6.6 to re-capture a
payment. However, recall that PD must contain the charging amount, date, and
merchant and transaction ID (see Section 6.4.1.1). Therefore if, for example, an
unscrupulous merchant tries to re-submit message 3 to the acquirer, the fraud
will be detected as soon as the issuer performs the authorisation. The issuer
will be able to detect that the transaction ID of a certain merchant matches a
previously submitted transaction. If the issuer maintains a record of the RAND
values used for each payment card account, a matching RAND in two different
transactions can also be an indication of merchant fraud. This is because the
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RAND must be re-used in the fraudulent transaction to enable the issuer to
decrypt the replayed CD and hence be able to authorise the payment. The
integrity of the CD and the PD is protected by use of the MAC.
Finally, the merchant server has access to large volumes of potentially sensi-
tive GSM subscriber information. As part of the user authentication process, the
merchant needs the user’s mobile number. The merchant server also knows the
name of the user since it is typically entered in the purchase form. As a result,
the merchant server can collect mobile numbers and corresponding subscriber
names. However, this is analogous to supplying personal contact information in
a typical order form. Privacy laws then apply and may require order forms to
contain a privacy statement or a section for user consent if their personal data
is to be used for other purposes.
6.4.3.4 Threats to the acquirer and issuer
Threats to the acquirer are minimal, since it is responsible only for forwarding
messages between the issuer and the merchant server. Moreover, the information
that is transmitted via the acquirer is not sensitive.
Since the issuer is responsible for the identity authentication process, in
particular the comparison of the names, it is important to protect the issuer
against any attack which might cause the cardholder authentication process to
be bypassed.
In the protocol, the issuer retrieves the account holder name for any GSM
telephone number from the AuC. As a result, the same user privacy issue
described in the previous section also exists here. As for the protocol described
in Section 6.3, not only is this a sensitive privacy issue, but requiring the AuC
to supply such information may potentially be in breach of its licence and/or
data privacy legislation. It is therefore vital that the issuer is protected so that
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this information cannot be abused.
One way of mitigating this security issue is to make a slight modification to
the protocol of Section 6.4.2. In the revised protocol, shown in Figure 6.7, in
message 6 the AuC supplies only the encryption keyKc. Subsequently, two more
messages are required in the protocol. After successfully decrypting the CD and
verifying the MAC (using Kc), the issuer sends message 7 which contains the
cardholder name as well as the mobile number. The AuC is then required to
perform the matching between the name supplied in message 7 with the name
it has associated with the GSM number. The AuC finally sends the result of
the matching to the issuer (message 8).
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Figure 6.7: Revised protocol.
This modified protocol has the advantage that the AuC retains control of
sensitive subscriber information. However, it has the disadvantage of requiring
two more messages to be transferred, and also additional processing from the
AuC.
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Note that the revised protocol still allows the issuer and the acquirer to learn
the phone number for the purchaser. To avoid this, the merchant server could
send an encrypted MN to the acquirer (using a public encryption key for the
AuC), although messages 2, 3 and 4 would then need to contain an identifier
for the AuC of the user’s home network.
6.4.3.5 Threats to the Authentication Centre
If the integrity of the AuC could be compromised, then there are possible attacks
on the security of the user authentication and encryption processes. However, as
stated in Section 6.3, in such an event there are also many other serious attacks
to the security of the GSM network itself, and so we assume that the AuC is
well-protected.
6.4.4 Advantages and disadvantages
In this section, the advantages and disadvantages of the protocol described in
Section 6.4 are considered. The scheme has the same advantages and disadvan-
tages as listed in Section 6.3.4, with the following additional advantages.
1. The protocol provides card details’ confidentiality.
2. In the protocol, the merchant server has no access to the sensitive card de-
tails. As a result, the risks of storing unprotected card details in merchant
servers are eliminated.
The disadvantages are essentially the same as those for the previous scheme,
except that the issuer must establish a relationship with the mobile operator
instead of the merchant (this may be rather simpler to achieve, since the number
of issuers is much less than the number of merchants). As stated in Section 6.3.4,
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to avoid the need for many individual arrangements between merchants and
issuers, a Trusted Third Party (TTP) could be introduced to act as a ‘broker’
between the two parties.
6.4.5 Summary
We have proposed a second method of enhancing e-commerce transaction pro-
cessing security by exploiting the existing GSM security features. The protocol
provides user authentication and hence significantly reduces threats arising from
misuse of misappropriated card details. It also eliminates the risk of storing card
details in unencrypted form in merchant servers. As for the protocol described
in Section 6.3, this protocol works with a ‘standard’ GSM SIM and requires
only an appropriately equipped Mobile Equipment and a user PC. It therefore
imposes minimal overheads on the user, thus increasing the likelihood of suc-
cessful use. Again, the gains for the merchant in terms of reduced chargebacks
and for the issuer in lessened card frauds also appear significant. The possibility
of an increased revenue stream may also make the system attractive to GSM
operators.
6.4.6 A comparison of the two proposed protocols
The protocol proposed in Section 6.3 makes use of the GSM authentication
service while the protocol in Section 6.4 utilises the GSM data confidentiality
service. The former provides only user/cardholder authentication whereas the
latter provides also card details confidentiality and data integrity. In addition,
the protocol proposed in Section 6.4 is a more complete payment protocol since
it also offers transaction authorisation. However, by providing more security
services and authorisation, the protocol is more complex, involving eight mes-
sages compared with four messages in the other protocol. Moreover, the second
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protocol requires the card issuing bank and the acquiring bank to be involved
in a card transaction, while the first protocol does not.
6.5 Related work
There exist other GSM-based payment systems which we now briefly review.
• The payment scheme proposed by Claessens et al. [9] provides user au-
thentication using GSM. However, unlike the schemes discussed above, it
makes extensive use of SMS messaging.
• The GiSMo (G i(nternet) S M o(pen)) scheme was developed by Milli-
com International Cellular in 1999. In this scheme, consumers must first
open an electronic wallet over the Internet and supply their mobile phone
number. Every Internet transaction is then validated with a password
sent over the mobile phone using an SMS message. The GiSMo project,
however, ended in 2001.
• Mint3 and Paybox4 are both GSM-based payment systems. They too
require consumers to first open an e-wallet. Transactions in the two pro-
tocols involve either making or receiving calls using the designated mobile
phone.
• The Visa 3-D Secure Protocol provides cardholder authentication for mer-
chants using a card issuer server called the Access Control Server (ACS).
As stated in Section 3.3.3 the cardholder must enroll before using this pay-
ment security scheme. The protocol can be extended to be used in mobile
Internet devices such as WAP phones [89], in which case the transaction
flow remains similar to that specified in [90].
3http://www.mint.nu
4http://www.paybox.co.uk
125
6. GSM and E-Commerce
Broadly speaking, the other proposed GSM-based payment systems either
use SMS messaging, require e-consumers to open an e-wallet, and/or require
them to make or receive phone calls using a GSM phone. The protocols proposed
here, however, do not impose any such requirements. They simply utilise the
GSM subscriber authentication and data confidentiality services.
The Visa 3-D Secure Protocol is similar to the proposed protocols in that it
also provides cardholder authentication. However, the Visa protocol requires,
at minimum, the Visa Directory Server and the issuer ACS just to provide user
authentication. The payment authorisation process then has to be performed
separately. As a result, the two proposed protocols appear to have significant
advantages over the 3-D Secure scheme. Similar remarks apply to MasterCard’s
SPA scheme.
6.6 Extending the protocols to 3G/UMTS
Since the third generation (3G) mobile communication system is now being
implemented, in this section we describe a way in which the proposed protocols
can be extended to utilise the security services offered by the third generation
mobile system. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to briefly explain how
the security mechanisms for the 3G mobile system operate.
6.6.1 3G/UMTS security
The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is one of the 3G
mobile systems and is the focus of this section. The 3G/UMTS security features
outlined here are those given in the 3GPP specifications [1].
UMTS offers four main security services for the air interface. These are
subscriber identity confidentiality, mutual authentication, data confidentiality,
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and data integrity [1]. In this section, however, only the last three services
will be discussed, since they are the ones relevant to our protocols. For more
information on UMTS security, see, for example, [4, 5].
UMTS builds upon the GSM security features [5]. As in GSM, UMTS secu-
rity is based on a secret key K shared between a User Services Identity Module
(USIM), the UMTS equivalent of the GSM SIM, and the Authentication Centre
(AuC). As in GSM, a data ciphering key CK is generated as a result of an
authentication exchange between the ME and the base station. Again as in
GSM, the parameters for this authentication exchange are generated in advance
by the mobile user’s home network. In addition, and unlike GSM, an integrity
key, IK, is also generated as a result of this exchange.
6.6.2 Protocol extension
Since the subscriber authentication provided by UMTS is so similar to that of
GSM, our first protocol can easily be extended without significant modification.
The second protocol, however, can benefit from minor adaptation to take best
advantage of the UMTS security features. Specifically, instead of using a variant
of the encryption key Kc to compute the MAC, it is possible to use the integrity
key IK, thereby avoiding any key separation issues.
UMTS divides its functional communications into four main strata, namely
the application stratum, home stratum, serving stratum, and transport stratum.
Therefore, it may be possible to place our protocols into the application stratum
and configure the USIM and UMTS-capable ME to perform all the tasks of the
user PC. If this is the case, the trust required in the user PC will be minimised
or even eliminated.
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6.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, two protocols are proposed to enhance e-commerce security
by exploiting existing GSM security features. The two protocols provide card-
holder authentication, and hence a measure of non-repudiation for the Internet
payments, in a way that minimises the user overhead. The second protocol also
provides confidentiality protection for the card details, including, for example,
the account number. The proposed protocols can also be extended to use 3G
security features with very minor modifications.
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7. The Remaining Threats
The aim of this chapter is to identify threats which exist to all PCs when
they are used for e-commerce. These threats exist regardless of the protection
scheme employed for the transaction, and addressing them must be considered
as part of the overall solution to e-commerce security. The threats are divided
into three categories, namely those arising from active content, browser flaws,
and cookies.
It is important to note that much of the material in this chapter has previ-
ously been given in [54].
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7.1 Introduction
Sensitive information relating to e-commerce transactions is typically protected
using SSL/TLS while it is being transmitted over the Internet between a con-
sumer PC and a web server. Despite this, there remain significant threats arising
from the use of a PC to conduct a transaction.
In the most typical case, an Internet user conducts an electronic payment
transaction using a PC as a means to connect to the Internet. The security of
an Internet transaction then also depends on how the user PC is configured.
Most users, however, tend to use the default configuration. Therefore, in this
chapter, we consider the remaining threats to SSL/TLS protected transactions
based on the assumption that the user PC is in a ‘standard’ configuration.
There are numerous ways that a user PC can be attacked. However, in this
chapter, we consider three main means that could be used to compromise the
confidentiality, privacy, and/or integrity of the user’s information in a web-based
e-payment transaction scenario. These are through active content, browser vul-
nerabilities, and cookies.
7.2 Active content
Active content was introduced to overcome limitations of HTML, notably the
lack of computational capabilities on the client side of a web session [27]. Java
applets and ActiveX controls appear to be the most popular types of active
content used for web-page design. Examples of less popular executable content
include JavaScript, Telescript, and Word macros [64].
Although Java applets and ActiveX controls are similar in the way that they
are used to add interactivity and animation to web pages, the security features
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offered are somewhat different. In this section, Java security is first described
followed by the security of ActiveX.
7.2.1 Java applets
Java was introduced in 1995. It is an object-oriented programming language.
All Java programs use objects and every Java program is defined as a class,
i.e. a collection of data, stored in named fields, and code, organised into named
methods, that operates on that data [21].
Java programs can be run in two modes: in application mode and in applet
mode [82]. There used to be no security restrictions for a Java application.
In other words, Java applications had full access to system resources, just like
any other programs. On the other hand, Java applets, as embedded in HTML
documents, can be executed only from web browsers and must abide by the
rules of a security mechanism called the Java sandbox [82]. This distinction
between Java applets and Java applications has, however, become blurred over
time. Indeed, in the most recent version of Java, users of Java applications
are allowed to run an application within a sandbox that the user or system
administrator has defined [69]. Therefore, to some extent the security of Java
applications is now left to the user’s or system administrator’s discretion.
The Java sandbox, the core technology used to provide security for Java
applets, consists of three main components, namely the bytecode verifier, the
class loader, and the security manager [33, 64, 65, 69]. The bytecode verifier
ensures that only legitimate Java applets that conform to the Java language
specification, and that do not violate the Java language rules or name space
restrictions, can be run [30, 33]. The class loader, on the other hand, is the
component which is responsible for providing a particular class whenever it is
needed. The class loader goes through certain steps to load and define a class.
Details of such steps are outside the scope of this thesis and can be found, for
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example, in [69]. The last component, the security manager, enforces access
control to system resources and prohibits downloaded applets from executing
arbitrary file input/output functions. For instance, an applet is prevented from
reading from, or writing to, the file system of the computer on which it is
running. An applet is also prevented from engaging in networking activities,
such as listening to traffic or initiating network connections, apart from those
back to the computer from which it originated [27].
While the Java sandbox has the advantage of preventing malicious applets
from harming the user PC or accessing system resources, it also prevents them
from doing many beneficial things. As a result, the concept of applet signing was
introduced. A signed applet is then trusted and granted full access to system
resources, just like a Java application. Clearly, signing applets cannot guarantee
the safety of an applet [26]. Indeed, it only provides a way to determine the
author of a malicious applet. Consequently, a recent version of Java (Java
Developers Kit JDK 1.2) has a new security architecture which provides users
or programmers with the ability to impose a fine-grained access control process,
based on security policies and permissions [30].
7.2.2 ActiveX controls
An ActiveX control is an object that supports a customisable, programmatic
interface1. Using the methods, events, and properties exposed by a control, it
allows web authors to automate their HTML pages.
The security provisions for ActiveX controls are much simpler than those
for Java executables. Indeed, ActiveX does not provide a security mechanism
other than code signing. Just like a Java applet, a control can be signed using
Microsoft’s Authenticode [33]. A publisher can sign an ActiveX control by
obtaining a Software Publisher Certificate (SPC) from a Certification Authority
1Details can be found at http://www.microsoft.com/com/tech/activex.asp
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(CA). A signed control is then granted full access to system resources while
access for an unsigned control is left to the individual. The security policy of
ActiveX is therefore based on an all-or-nothing rule [26]. In other words, once
download of a control is permitted, it either has complete access to the system
resources or it is not run at all.
By comparison, a signed Java applet can be granted varying levels of privi-
leges. This, however, does not necessarily imply that Java security is better than
ActiveX. For Java applets, it is an individual decision whether or not to grant
access to an applet and to decide the level of rights the applet is granted [27].
Consequently, Java content is more complex to manage, even though users have
more control over downloaded applets.
7.2.3 Security implications
While SSL/TLS is typically used to protect Internet transactions, it cannot
prevent a rogue applet from harming a user PC or compromising sensitive in-
formation. A user can still be lured to a malicious web site containing Java or
ActiveX ‘Trojan horses’ which, for example, run a bogus dialogue box asking
for a username and password, or record keystrokes. The site can even open an
SSL/TLS connection with the user to make things appear more authentic and
convincing.
A Java applet or an ActiveX control can be signed or unsigned. As stated
above, the signatures on these applets provide no assurance that they will not
behave maliciously. It is only the identity of the software developer which is
verified, not the content itself. What the signature does provide is a method to
support the generation of an audit trail since it enables the authentication of
the author of the content. However, it may still be possible for a Java applet
or an ActiveX control to conceal its activities by modifying the audit log after
harming the machine. As a result, it becomes more difficult for the user to
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identify which applet, and thence its author, has damaged their PC.
Various techniques have been proposed to control active content behaviour.
One example is the set of mechanisms proposed by Hassler and Then [34], which
are based on a method for monitoring and controlling Java applets and their
threads running in a browser. They describe the implementation of a prototype
monitoring applet, which, for convenience in constructing the prototype, was
programmed as a normal applet, and hence has the same privileges as other
applets. This limits the degree to which protection can be offered. Hence, and
as described in [34], if this idea was used ‘for real’, then the monitoring applet
would need to be implemented as part of the browser and given the highest
privileges.
Another example is the Windows Personalisation technique, proposed by Ty-
gar and Whitten [87]. This method is designed to counter attacks that imitate
the visual appearance of a program that the user already trusts with sensitive
information. The main idea is to use window appearances which are easily recog-
nised by the user, but difficult to predict by an attacker. However, information
for such personalisation still needs to be sent, and hence can be captured by a
Java applet.
In [2] a technique called a Safe Interpreter is described which performs the
functions of access control, independence of contexts and management of trust.
The details of how the Safe Interpreter works are beyond the scope of this thesis.
However, it is worth noting that, although the technique may be effective, it
also increases system complexity and potentially damages performance.
In conclusion, dealing with the security issues raised by active content ap-
pears to be a problem to which a completely satisfactory solution does not yet
exist. Whilst restricting the capabilities of ActiveX controls or Java applets will
improve security, this is probably not a satisfactory solution for the majority of
users, since it prevents the delivery of services which may be valued by users.
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A possible way of solving such problem, however, may be to use a combination
of two approaches: verifying a signature on the downloadable code, including
trust chain verification, and monitoring the code as it executes. Nonetheless,
the complexity of code monitoring must be limited to try to prevent serious
damage whilst not dramatically degrading performance.
7.3 Web browser flaws
Web browsers are large and complex pieces of software and hence are likely
to contain security flaws. From time to time, vulnerabilities in web browsers
are exploited to compromise user PCs and/or associated security measures such
as SSL/TLS. It is not the aim of this section to list all known web browser
vulnerabilities. However, it is worth giving an example of such a flaw to show
how they might pose threats to a user even when SSL/TLS is in use.
In May 2000, a report was published [8] indicating that Netscape browsers
do not validate a SSL/TLS server certificate properly, allowing attackers to im-
personate a site. According to the report, Netscape Navigator correctly checks
the server certificate at the beginning of an SSL/TLS session. However, while
the SSL/TLS session is active, all HTTPS connections to the server’s IP ad-
dress are assumed to be a part of this session, and therefore the certificate is not
checked again. Instead of comparing host names to those of currently opened
sessions, Navigator compares IP addresses. Given that IP spoofing is possible,
and more than one host name can have the same IP address, there is potential
for a security breach.
Most web browser security flaws are patched soon after they are discovered.
However, whilst they are present, browser vulnerabilities can diminish or even
disable essential functionalities of a security measure such as server authentica-
tion in SSL/TLS, as in the example above, or user authentication, as will be
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seen in Section 7.4.2. It is also worth noting that there may be other security
flaws in web browsers which are not generally known, and can be exploited by
a malicious user. As stated above, web browsers are complex, and hence it is
almost impossible to avoid the presence of some security flaws. Therefore, it is
important that an Internet user should check and update his/her web browser as
often as possible, to mitigate the risks of browser vulnerabilities being exploited.
7.4 Cookies
Cookies are pieces of information generated by a web server to be stored in a
user’s machine [62]. Their primary purpose is to enable clients to store protocol
state, since HTTP operates in a stateless fashion. The information in cookies
can be, for example, selected items in a user’s shopping cart, authentication
information used for accessing restricted pages, or account details. In a typical
scenario, the first time a browser contacts a web server, a cookie is sent from
the latter to the former. It is then stored in the user PC in a file called either
cookies.txt, Cookies, or MagicCookie in the Windows, UNIX, and Macintosh
operating systems respectively [62]. The next time the browser requests a web
page from the web server, it sends the corresponding cookies (where cookies are
indexed by the URLs of the remote servers which supply them).
Cookie-related security threats can be divided into three main categories,
namely monitoring user behaviour using cookies, compromising confidentiality
of cookie contents, and malicious cookies. In this section, we identify threats
that cookies can pose to a user PC. Detailed analysis of cookie security is
postponed until the next chapter.
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7.4.1 Monitoring user behaviour using cookies
A particularly controversial issue concerning cookies relates to their possible
use as tracking devices to follow user movements across the Internet [26]. Web-
advertising agencies such as DoubleClick, Focalink, Globaltrack, and ADSmart
run advertisement banners on various sites. Their clients add an <IMG> (im-
age) tag to the client HTML page, pointing to a URL on the advertising agency’s
server [82]. When a web browser sees this <IMG> tag, it contacts the ad-
vertising agency server to retrieve the graphic. The first time the graphic is
downloaded from the site, the user browser will receive a cookie containing a
random ID. From then on, every time the browser connects to a site containing
the agency’s advertisement banners, it sends the cookie (the random ID) along
with the URL of the page that is being read [82] back to the advertising agency
server.
After a period of time, the advertising agency will be able to generate a
user profile, revealing user browsing habits and interests. This might be used to
improve advertising campaigns, to target advertisements to user interests, and
to avoid repeatedly showing the same advertisements to a user [82]. The ability
to track users is a potential violation of user privacy. It is also possible that
advertising servers might share such information without user consent, although,
at the time of writing, there is no strong evidence of such behaviour.
Even though using cookies as a tracking device may not reveal the actual
identity of a user, the fact that an advertising agency server can maintain a
list of URLs that a user has viewed can lead to a possible compromise of user
personal details. In particular, if a web server uses the GET method to input
data from an HTML form to a CGI script running on a remote server, the
information will be sent as a part of the URL. Therefore, anyone who can read
the URL will be able to obtain the information in the form.
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7.4.2 Compromising confidentiality of cookie contents
In order to allow users to browse among restricted pages without repeatedly
identifying themselves, cookies are used to store authentication information
such as user names and passwords [26]. Consequently, it is important to en-
sure the confidentiality and authenticity of cookies storing such information.
Otherwise, anyone who can access such cookies can potentially impersonate the
user. Although, in many cases, authentication information stored in cookies is
in a server-specific format, and hence the contents are not immediately obvious
to the reader, it is still possible for an attacker to simply replay an intercepted
cookie and impersonate a user.
Implementation flaws, particularly in web browsers, can create security vul-
nerabilities. For example, a vulnerability in Internet Explorer Version 4 and 5
for Windows 95, 98, NT, and 2000, allowed any site to see the content of other
sites’ cookies [32]. This is because the browser could not cope a site having
a long URL ending with the domain name of another server with that other
server. Consequently, it was possible for a malicious web site to give itself a
long URL ending with a sequence of characters identical to the URL of another
site, and the malicious site was then able to access cookies stored by that other
site. If a cookie contains personal information, e.g. confidential data such as ac-
count details, then the consequences of such a vulnerability can be significant.
Although the web browser flaw has been fixed, it is possible that there are other
undiscovered vulnerabilities that can pose security threats to users.
A configuration flaw can also pose a threat to the confidentiality of cookie
content. An example of this lies in the way that Netscape Navigator folders are
sometimes stored in a publicly accessible directory. In an environment where
there are not as many computers as users, it is not unusual to provide public
spaces for users to access their data from any computers within the environment.
Such spaces are accessible to any users with a valid username and password.
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For example, a college can provide a drive for student to store their home
pages. In this drive, each student has his/her own directory. Any students
with a valid username and password can access the drive, and hence other
students’ directories. An empirical study [53] showed that a number of cookie
files could be found in this publicly accessible drive. This is because some users
had stored their Netscape Navigator folder in a publicly accessible directory.
Since Netscape Navigator stores user cookie files in the user’s Netscape folder,
this means that user cookies will also be stored in a publicly accessible location,
i.e. accessible by any other users with a legitimate username and password.
The study showed that it was possible to use this weakness to obtain personal
details, ranging from user names to full user details including contact addresses
and telephone numbers.
7.4.3 Malicious cookies
It is often rather misleadingly stated that cookies are just text files, and hence
are harmless. Although cookies are application data files, they can include
special tags that can introduce executable code; for example, Microsoft Office
application files can contain Macro viruses.
In HTML, in order to distinguish text from ‘markup’ symbols, a set of char-
acters such as ‘<’, which typically indicates the beginning of an HTML tag,
are defined as special. Tags can either affect the formatting of a web page or
introduce a program that will be executed by web browsers. For example, a
<SCRIPT> tag introduces code from a variety of scripting languages [7, 75].
Many web servers use information stored in cookies to create dynamic pages.
Therefore, if a cookie includes those special tags, when a page incorporating
this cookie is displayed a malicious program can be called and executed. The
security effects of such a program can range from alterations of the submitted
form, to bypassing an authentication process. However, what exactly can be
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done by the called program depends on the language in which it is written, as
well as the web server’s security context configuration.
7.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, threats which exist to all PCs used to conduct Internet trans-
actions are examined. It is important to consider such threats since they exist
regardless of the protection scheme used for the transaction. In this chapter,
we divide such threats into three categories, namely those arising from active
content, browser flaws, and cookies.
Active content, especially Java applets and ActiveX controls, can pose a
variety of threats to the user PC. These include showing bogus dialogue boxes
prompting for username and password entry, and monitoring keystrokes. A
number of techniques have been proposed to control active content behaviour.
However, enhancing the security of active content leads to a difficult dilemma.
Imposing more control over active content gives greater security but, at the
same time, can block many useful functions that active content might perform.
Although fine-grained control could be imposed on a piece of code so that it is
allowed to perform only the functions it is authorised to, such a mechanism is
likely to be complex and hence difficult to manage, at least for the majority of
users.
From time to time, browser vulnerabilities have been discovered. Developing
and patching browsers is a continuous process. Browsers continue to grow in
complexity, in parallel with just about every other major application, and host
operating system. It is therefore almost impossible to avoid the presence of
vulnerabilities and flaws. As a result, it is important for the user to be aware
of such threats and to keep their browser updated.
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Threats which arise from the introduction of cookies can be divided into three
types, namely monitoring user behaviour using cookies, loss of confidentiality
of cookie contents, and malicious cookies. In the next chapter, we propose
two cookie encryption protocols which can be used to enhance the security of
cookies.
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The aim of this chapter is to describe possible ways to enhance the secu-
rity of cookies, i.e. to protect their confidentiality and integrity, and to enable
their source to be authenticated. The chapter starts with Section 8.2, a review
of the security services which are required to defeat the threats outlined pre-
viously in Chapter 7. In Section 8.3, various mechanisms which can be used
to meet the security requirements are examined. An existing server-managed
cookie encryption approach, the ‘Secure Cookies’ protocol [71], is subsequently
described in Section 8.4, followed in Sections 8.5 and 8.6 by detailed descriptions
of two new user-managed cookie encryption protocols. The two approaches are
then compared in Section 8.7. The last section summarises and concludes the
chapter.
Much of the material in this chapter has previously been described in [55].
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8.1 Introduction
Today, browsing and on-line shopping are becoming increasingly convenient.
A user can personalise a web page, have his/her own shopping cart, and be
automatically authenticated to a web server without repeatedly entering his
or her username and password. However, the stateless nature of the HTTP
protocol does not support such features, which are instead supported by files
called cookies, stored on the user’s PC. Cookies were specifically introduced to
enable web servers to maintain current session state and recognise individual
users.
A cookie consists of six elements, namely Name, Expiration Date, the Do-
main name, Path, Secure, and String Data. The first part is the name of the
cookie. The expiry date defines the cookie’s lifetime. The domain name and
path are used when a browser searches for a cookie corresponding to the host
of the requested URL. The path attribute specifies the subset of the URLs to
which the cookie belongs. The secure attribute indicates whether the cookie is
transmitted in secure mode such as TLS and HTTPS. The String Data field
is where all other information of the server’s choice is stored. Detailed cookie
specifications can be found in a variety of places, see for example [61, 62, 68].
While cookies are clearly very useful, they can also be abused to impersonate
a user, compromise user privacy and, in some cases, reveal confidential user
information (see Section 7.4). Although a number of papers, e.g. [3, 26, 31, 62,
80, 82], point out potential security threats, most of them focus on facts about
cookies, such as what they are and how they are used, and do not appear to
provide a satisfactory security analysis and solution.
In [71] Park and Sandhu propose the ‘Secure Cookies’ method, in which
security measures are applied to cookies by a web server. Consequently, this
approach allows web servers to control what, when and how the security proce-
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dures will be performed.
Whilst a server-managed approach may be appropriate for many applica-
tions, in some environments users will wish to control the security of their own
cookies. This chapter, therefore, examines possible user-controlled approaches
to enhance cookie security.
In Section 8.2, the security requirements necessary to defeat the threats
identified in Section 7.4 are outlined. Various options available to meet the
security requirements are then examined in Section 8.3. The server-controlled
approach is then outlined in Section 8.4 followed by two different methods of
realising the user-controlled approach (sections 8.5 and 8.6). A comparison
between the server-managed and user-managed approaches is subsequently given
in Section 8.7. The final section summarises and concludes the chapter.
8.2 Security requirements
In this section, a number of security requirements are identified to deal with the
security threats discussed in Section 7.4. Note that these security requirements
do not address the threat that cookies could be used to monitor user behaviour.
Such threats are typically tackled by using tools specially designed to monitor
the activity of cookies, such as Cookie Pal1 or Cookie Crusher2.
8.2.1 Cookie confidentiality
As stated in Section 7.4.2, cookies can be used to store authentication data with
which a client uses to authenticate him/herself to the remote web server, and
personal details such as mailing addresses and credit card numbers. Therefore,
1http://www.kburra.com/cpal.html
2http://www.thelimitsoft.com/cookie/
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it is important to provide confidentiality for cookies so that such information
can be protected. There are two ways in which information in cookies might be
revealed. Firstly, a cookie can be intercepted while it is being transmitted, and,
secondly, a cookie can be disclosed while it is stored in a user’s machine. We
consider ways in which both threats can be addressed.
8.2.2 Cookie integrity
In order to prevent attacks such as cross-site scripting, i.e. where special tags
are inserted into cookies as described in Section 7.4.3, maintaining the integrity
of cookie data is vital. Moreover, if a cookie is used to authenticate a user
to a remote web server and the content of the cookie is changed, then the
authentication process will fail. An attacker could thus modify such a cookie,
and hence prevent a legitimate user from accessing a service. The integrity of
the domain name and Path in cookies is also important. If it is possible to
change these elements, then cookies can be sent to an entity other than the
owner.
8.2.3 Cookie authentication
Although the content of a cookie may be encrypted and protected from unautho-
rised modifications, there remains the possibility of an attack where one entity
‘presents’ a cookie copied from another party. Consequently, it is important to
be able to verify that the entity supplying a cookie is the owner of that cookie
and the cookie is authentic.
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8.3 Meeting the security requirements
There are various ways of meeting the security requirements stated above. This
section examines the possible options in more detail, and considers their advan-
tages and disadvantages.
8.3.1 Browsers
Although browsers do not satisfy all the security requirements stated earlier,
current browsers provide an option which seems to enable users to control the
use of cookies. To be more precise, they offer the users the choice of accepting all
cookies, refusing all cookies, or displaying a warning message before accepting
a cookie. However, this is likely to be insufficient, since it is difficult for a user
to make a decision as to which alternative to choose. Selecting the first option
may not be a good idea, since in this case users will have no control over the
use of cookies. On the other hand, disabling all cookies will deny access to their
useful features and, as a result, browsing will become stateless. Therefore, the
last option seems to offer an attractive middle path to a user. However, this
option is very intrusive, since, whilst web browsing, users will very frequently
be asked whether or not they wish to accept a cookie. Moreover, users tend to
either accept or reject all cookies, because it is hard to identify which cookies
should be accepted and which should not. Choosing this compromise option is
then little different from the first or second option.
8.3.2 Secure channels
One way to secure cookies is to protect the channel via which they are trans-
mitted, i.e. the link between a web browser and a web server, by using protocols
such as SSL/TLS or HTTPS. These protocols provide confidentiality and in-
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tegrity protection for transmitted data using an encrypted channel and MACs
respectively. However, a secure channel only protects the information against
eavesdropping and modifications en route. Once the cookie reaches its destina-
tion it is no longer protected by SSL/TLS, and hence this option provides only
partial protection. Anyone who has access to the stored cookie file will be able
to read, change, or replay it.
An advantage of this option, however, is that it is transparent to a user.
Moreover, it makes use of existing capabilities, and therefore does not require
modifications to web browsers. However, in order to send a cookie securely, the
cookie’s ‘Secure’ attribute must be set. Since cookies are generated by servers, it
is completely in the server’s hands whether the ‘Secure’ attribute is set. Given
that most users are not aware whether or not cookies are sent via a secure
channel, many web servers send them in clear.
Secure channels can provide user authentication; however, even in the un-
likely event that this is used, this does not guarantee the origin of a cookie. In
order to provide authentication for a cookie, there should exist some means to
link the user authentication used in the secure channel establishment process
with the cookie itself.
8.3.3 Access control for user PCs
Another way of providing security for cookies is to protect user PCs against
unauthorised access. A user authentication technique, e.g. using passwords, can
restrict access to a PC, thereby protecting stored cookies against unauthorised
reading and modification. The main advantage of such an approach is its sim-
plicity. It is relatively easy to implement since most users are accustomed to
using passwords. There is also no need to modify web browsers.
A disadvantage of this mechanism is that it only protects cookies while they
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are in a PC. Therefore, it may have to be employed with other mechanisms to
enhance security. Furthermore, it does not provide a mechanism to prove the
authenticity of a cookie, since a malicious user can still reuse a stolen cookie. The
use of passwords may also require additional management to prevent dictionary
attacks.
8.3.4 Cryptographic protection within cookie files
A combination of cryptographic techniques can be used to meet all three security
requirements for cookies. Cookie encryption can be used for confidentiality.
Both cookie integrity and cookie authentication can be provided by using a MAC
or digital signature. As part of cookie authentication, cookie replay protection
can be achieved by incorporating cookie transfer into an authentication protocol
(e.g. using a time stamp).
Cookie encryption and integrity protection can protect a cookie both when
it is stored and when it is transmitted, unlike secure channels which do not
protect stored cookies (see Section 8.3.2). There is thus no need for additional
access control to user PCs. However, a disadvantage of using cryptographic
techniques is that keys are required. Key management issues, such as how to
securely exchange the keys, where they should be stored, and who should keep
them, have to be taken into account. Additionally, there is a possibility that
web browser modifications or additional software will be required.
8.3.5 Summary
In practice, a system can combine some or all of the four methods described
above to enhance security. However, the last technique, i.e. applying crypto-
graphic protection to the cookie file itself, appears to offer the widest range of
security services. For this reason, this approach is the focus of the remainder of
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the chapter.
Applying cryptographic measures to cookie files can be performed by web
servers or web browsers. Whichever does so will have control over what, when
and how the measures are performed. In the remainder of this chapter, we
examine the two approaches, and consider their respective merits.
8.4 Server-managed cookie encryption
Server-controlled cookie encryption has the major benefit of user transparency.
If implemented appropriately, no changes to web browsers will be required. A
disadvantage of this approach is obviously that users will have little control
over the protection of their own cookies. An example of this approach is the
Microsoft Passport scheme3 which was introduced to provide an online user-
authentication service where a user presents a cookie to authenticate him/herself
to a remote web server. It employs encrypted cookies as a means of exchanging
user-authentication information between a Microsoft Passport server and par-
ticipating web sites. Another example of server-managed cookie encryption is
the ‘Secure Cookie’ scheme proposed by Park and Sandhu [71].
Although these two schemes are similar in the way that they use encrypted
cookies, the latter is more general in that it is a means of protecting all user
cookies, and not just those generated by a single application. As a result, we use
the Park and Sandhu ‘Secure Cookie’ scheme as the basis for a comparison with
the new user-managed cookie security scheme proposed in Section 8.5. In the
remainder of this section, we provide a brief overview of the Park and Sandhu
scheme.
In this approach, web servers are required to use ‘Secure Cookies’ of specific
kinds, each with a predefined type of content and protection. Examples include
3details are available at http://www.passport.com/
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Name Cookies, Life Cookies, Key Cookies, and Seal Cookies. A Name Cookie,
for example, contains a user name that can be used to authenticate a user to
a server, and a Key Cookie contains an encryption key. The integrity of all
cookies is protected by a Seal Cookie that holds either a MAC or a signed hash
of the other cookies.
In order to have a set of Secure Cookies, a web browser needs to contact
another server called the Cookie Issuer, which generates the Secure Cookies.
The web browser then sends the cookies to the web server, which will verify or
decrypt them as appropriate. Examples of Secure Cookies are listed in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Secure Cookie Components
Domain Flag Path Cookie Name Cookie Value Secure Date
acme.com True / Name cookie Alice False 12/31/2003
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
acme.com True / Life cookie 12/31/02 False 12/31/2003
acme.com True / Pswd cookie Hashed password False 12/31/2003
acme.com True / Key cookie Encrypted key False 12/31/2003
acme.com True / Seal cookie Signed Message False 12/31/2003
Digest of MAC
This approach satisfies the security requirements of confidentiality, integrity,
and user authentication, by using encryption, a signed message digest or MAC,
and a digital signature respectively. However, it does not provide protection
against replay attacks. A stolen Secure Cookie can be submitted to the web
server.
The Key Cookie, as stated earlier, stores a session key that is used to encrypt
and decrypt other cookies. The session key can be encrypted using either a
server public key or a server secret key. In either case, web servers are responsible
for key management.
While this approach may be appropriate in many applications, in some cir-
cumstances users may wish to read their own cookies and control their security.
Consequently, in the next section we examine possible approaches that give
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users more control.
8.5 User-managed cookie encryption
With a user-managed approach, users obviously have the benefit of control over
what, when and how the security mechanisms should be applied. However, a
special web browser or additional software is required in order to enable users to
perform the security procedures. The client may also have to store cryptographic
keys, which could be a security threat in some circumstances. As a result, there
is a need for a key management system to support the use of cryptography.
In this section, two possible approaches, using symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography, are described at a high level (in Section 8.6 these schemes are
given in more detail). In order to provide cookie confidentiality, integrity and
authentication, the schemes use encryption, MACs, signatures, and time stamps.
The security mechanisms described below will be applied only to the cookie
value, to minimise the complexity of the protocols.
8.5.1 Using symmetric cryptography
In this approach, a user selects cookie encryption by sending a request for cookie
encryption to the web server. This will trigger a key establishment protocol.
If a user chooses to encrypt cookies, he/she will be required to authenticate
him/herself to his/her PC and the key management application, e.g. by using a
password. This is required in order to prevent an unauthorised user, who may
have access to the user’s PC, from activating the security procedure and using
cookies. Key establishment can be performed by sending the key via a secure
channel, or by using other key distribution techniques such as those involving a
trusted third party. After successful key establishment, the user and the server
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then share a secret cookie key and the server will encrypt cookies with the key
and send them to the user. The encrypted cookies are then stored locally in the
user’s PC.
The next time the web browser requests a web page from the site, it looks for
corresponding encrypted cookies. A time stamp is generated and concatenated
with the cookies, and a MAC is computed on this data. A page request, the
time stamp, the encrypted cookies and the MAC are then sent to the server. On
receipt of the request, the server verifies the MAC and checks whether the time
stamp is within the acceptance window. The server can change information in
the cookies whenever the user requests a page, and the new encrypted cookie
will be sent back to the user with the requested page.
A time stamp and a MAC are included in order to prevent an intercepted
cookie from being replayed. Without knowing the secret cookie key, an ad-
versary will not be able to create a valid MAC. There are no cryptographic
requirements for time stamp generation — the time stamp only needs to be
within the acceptance window.
Given that symmetric cryptographic operations are typically simple to com-
pute, the encryption operation will not significantly increase the server work-
load. Users only need to decrypt a received cookie if they want to see the
content. However, this approach needs a secure means to distribute the secret
key the first time the user and server communicate. Moreover, users and servers
need to maintain the shared secret key. As the number of users (n) and servers
(m) grows, the total number of keys will be bounded above by mn, and the task
of key management will therefore become increasingly complicated over time.
More generally, one effect of this is to make cookie management by servers a
stateful process, i.e. servers are required to maintain state for web users.
Since the security of this approach depends on the secrecy of the shared key,
it is vital to store the key securely. To meet this requirement, a user could store
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the keys in a smart card or in a password-protected file on his/her PC. In the
former case, the user would typically be required to authenticate him/herself to
the card before the card will perform any computation using its stored keys.
8.5.2 Using asymmetric cryptography
In this approach, users are required to have an asymmetric key pair and a
certificate for the public key from this key pair. If a user wishes to have his/her
cookies encrypted, the first time the user requests a web page his/her certificate
and the page request message will be signed and sent. The server then generates
a secret key, encrypts the cookies with this secret key, encrypts the secret key
with the user’s public key, and sends the encrypted secret key with the encrypted
cookies and the requested page. There is no need for the user to decrypt the
cookie unless he/she wants to know the cookie content. The next time the user
contacts the server, the encrypted cookie, a time stamp, and a MAC is sent
with a web page request.
As for the symmetric technique, this approach allows users to decide if they
want to encrypt the cookie or not. If the user sends a certificate, the server will
know that the cookie must be sent encrypted. The user will also be required
to enter a password for user authentication to the PC, since his/her private key
may be stored locally in the PC. It is also possible for the private key to be
stored in another more secure way, e.g. on a smart card. In such case, the user is
still required to authenticate him/herself to the device to prevent unauthorised
use. As for the symmetric cryptography approach, the time stamp is used to
prevent replay of an intercepted cookie.
A drawback of this technique is that certificates and key pairs are required
for the client. A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) will also be needed to create
and manage public key certificates. Again, as with the symmetric cryptography
scheme, the protocol makes web serving stateful. However this would appear to
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be unavoidable.
8.6 User-managed cookie protocols
In this section, two protocols for user-managed cookie security are described in
detail, building on the general approaches described in the previous section.
8.6.1 Cookie encryption using symmetric cryptography
In this approach, a secure channel is employed to distribute a cookie key. How
this secure channel is established is outside the scope of this paper, but it could,
for example, be provided using protocols such as TLS and HTTPS.
The protocol is defined in Figure 8.1. In the protocol description:
• ‘Client’ can represent additional software, e.g. a modified web browser, a
plug-in, or an applet which performs security procedures for users,
• ‘Server’ represents a web server,
• X||Y denotes the concatenation of data items X and Y ,
• K denotes a secret key used to encrypt cookies (the ‘cookie key’),
• eK(M) denotes message M encrypted (using symmetric encryption) with
key K,
• ‘Key ID’ identifies the cookie key K used to encrypt the cookie,
• T denotes a time stamp, and
• MACK(M) denotes a MAC on message M using a variant of key K (note
that it is important that the key used to compute the MAC is not precisely
the same as the key used for encryption, particularly if the MAC is a
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CBC-MAC based on the same block cipher as used to perform cookie
encryption).
  Client           Server 
 
    1.Establish a Secure Channel  
     and send Request for a page     
                                  
                    2. - Generate cookie  
key (K) 
- Generate a cookie  
- Encrypt and send  
the cookie      
- Store Key ID with  
K 
                    3. Key ID, eK(Cookie), K,  
                           Requested page 
  
 
4. - Store encrypted 
     cookie with Key ID, 
     and the Key ID with K 
 
 The next time the client requests a page from the Web site: 
     
5. - Generate a time stamp T. 
   - Concatenate it with the 
     encrypted cookie 
   - Compute a MAC on the result 
                                                       
  6. Request for a page, Key ID,  
     T, eK(Cookie), MACK(eK(Cookie)|| T) 
   
                                
   7. - Verify the MAC    
- Check if the time  
      stamp T is within  
      the acceptance  
                     window. If so,  
    send requested   
    page; otherwise,  
    decline the       
    request 
                  8. Requested page, eK(Cookie) 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Cookie encryption using symmetric cryptography.
The protocol starts when a user chose to encrypt cookies. The client first
sends a request for a page. Upon receipt of this request, the server generates
the cookie key (K) and cookie(s) which is (are) subsequently encrypted using
the key. It is important for the server to assign a key ID to each key so that the
right key will be retrieved to decrypt the cookie in the future. The key ID is
then stored by the server with the corresponding key. The cookie key, the key
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ID, and the encrypted cookie are then sent to the user as illustrated in step 3 in
Figure 8.1. Although the cookie key is provided by the server, the user does not
need to decrypt the cookie to complete the protocol. The information received
from the server only needs to be stored on the user PC.
The next time the client requests a page from the server, it first generates
a time stamp (T), concatenates it with the encrypted cookie, and computes a
MAC on the result. The request for a page, the key ID, the encrypted cookie,
the MAC, and the time stamp are then sent to the server (step 6). Upon
receipt of the message, the server first verifies the MAC and checks whether the
time stamp is within the acceptance window. If both checks are positive, the
requested page with updated encrypted cookie are sent to the client (step 8).
Otherwise, the server rejects the client request and the protocol ends.
8.6.2 Cookie encryption using asymmetric cryptography
The public key based scheme is specified in Figure 8.2. In the protocol descrip-
tion, the following notation is employed (in addition to that used in Figure 8.1):
• EP (X) denotes data X encrypted (using asymmetric encryption) with
public key P ,
• SC(M) denotes the signature of the client on messageM (computed using
the client private key), and
• PC denotes the public key of the client.
As in the symmetric approach, the protocol starts when the user chooses to
encrypt cookies. The request for a page is then sent together with the user public
key certificate and a signature on the request concatenated with the certificate.
The signature is particularly important because it allows servers to detect an
attack where a malicious user deletes the request for cookie encryption (the user
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Figure 8.2: Cookie encryption using asymmetric cryptography.
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certificate). If an attack is detected, the server can send a message to inform
the user and ask if the user wants to try again. This, however, introduces a risk
of denial of service where a malicious user keeps modifying the message causing
the page request to fail. Moreover, the additional computation of the signing
process can increase the user machine’s workload and possibly slow the page
request process.
Upon the receipt of message 1 in Figure 8.2, the server verifies the signature,
generates a cookie key (K) and encrypts it with the client public key (PC). It
then generates and encrypts cookie(s) with the key K and assigns an ID to K.
The key ID is subsequently stored with its corresponding cookie key.
The server constructs a message consisting of the requested page, the cookie
ID, the encrypted cookie, and the encrypted key. It then sends the message,
which corresponds to message 3 in Figure 8.2, to the client. Upon receipt of
the message, the client stores the encrypted cookie with the key ID, and the
encrypted key with the key ID. The next time the client contacts the server,
the process resembles that in the symmetric approach.
8.6.3 Comparisons
The main advantage of the symmetric approach is convenience. It makes use of
existing security protocols, i.e. SSL/TLS, to distribute the cookie key. However,
doing so requires the establishment of such secure channel. Another drawback
is that key management is relatively complicated, since there will be a large
number of cookie keys for users to manage and store securely.
On the other hand, the main advantage of the asymmetric approach is that
the key management task is not so complicated. Key distribution is also simpler
than in the system based on symmetric cryptography. Moreover, cookie keys
are stored encrypted. The only key a user has to keep secret is the private key
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needed to decrypt the cookie keys.
8.6.4 Security services
The user-managed cookie approach satisfies all three security requirements. In
addition to those described in Section 8.2, it also offers user authentication. The
two proposed protocols provide the four security services in the following ways.
• Confidentiality: The two protocols proposed here use either symmetric
or asymmetric encryption to provide cookie confidentiality.
• Cookie Integrity: The symmetric approach uses only a MAC to protect
the integrity of the cookie. The asymmetric approach also requires use of
a signature to ensure that a malicious party will not be able to delete the
request for cookie encryption.
• Cookie authentication: The protocols both use a time stamp to provide
protection against replay attacks.
• User authentication: The user-managed cookie approach provides this
security service by requiring users to enter a password to activate the
security protocol and use cookies.
8.7 Secure cookies vs. user-managed cookies
In this section, a detailed comparison between the server-controlled and user-
controlled approaches is provided.
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8.7.1 User authentication
The Secure Cookies method [71] offers three choices for a user to authenticate
him/herself to a server, namely by IP address, by signature, and by password.
The first alternative is not always appropriate since in some environments IP
addresses are assigned dynamically. Moreover, it is prone to an IP spoofing
attack.
The second user authentication mechanism is signature-based, and requires
users to have a public key pair in order to sign a time stamp in a cookie.
However, the signing process can increase the user workload, and hence possibly
slow the web-browsing process.
Both Secure cookies and user-managed cookies employ user passwords. How-
ever, in the Secure Cookies technique the password must be sent via a secure
channel to a web server for verification. Therefore, in addition to the cookie
security process, a secure channel may be needed. By contrast, in the user-
managed methods the password is verified locally, which lessens its exposure
and avoids the need for secure channel establishment.
8.7.2 Integrity and confidentiality
The Secure Cookies scheme uses signatures and MACs. The user-managed
cookie security schemes also use either a signature or a MAC. In both cases, an
additional computation for the encryption process is required.
Both techniques offer a choice between symmetric and asymmetric encryp-
tion to provide cookie content confidentiality. However, one disadvantage of the
user-managed scheme is that the required cryptographic keys will have to be
stored by the clients.
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8.7.3 Cookie authentication
In the Secure Cookies approach, there is no mechanism for replay protection.
The user-managed cookie security schemes, however, use a time stamp to pro-
vide protection against replay attacks. However, a MAC must be included in
order to prevent a malicious user from replaying a stolen cookie with a new time
stamp, potentially increasing the user’s workload.
8.7.4 Other issues
The main advantage of the user-managed approach over Secure Cookies is prob-
ably the fact that it allows users to have more control over the security of their
own cookies. By contrast, with Secure Cookies, web servers have full control
over cookie encryption. Although this may be appropriate for many applica-
tions, in some environments users may wish to have more control over their
security — indeed, if users wish to read their own cookies, e.g. to deal with the
threat of user tracking, then a user-controlled approach is essential. Moreover,
the Secure Cookies method may be more complex since a set of cookies is re-
quired for each web site. There is also a need for an Issuing Cookie server to
generate the Secure Cookies.
8.7.5 Further development
Recently another server-controlled protocol has been proposed by Yang and
Rhee [94]. This protocol, however, is not entirely server-managed. Rather, it is
a combination of user and server managed approaches. The authors propose use
of a set of secure cookies similar to those used in the Park and Sandhu scheme.
The cookies are then encrypted with a secret key which is sent encrypted with
the server public key, as in the protocol described in Section 8.6.2. The Yang
and Rhee protocol differs from the protocol in Section 8.6.2 in that the client
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generates the secret cookie key rather than the server.
8.8 Summary and conclusions
Although cookies are a very useful mechanism for maintaining session state, as
discussed earlier they can pose a number of security threats. As a result, three
cookie security requirements, namely confidentiality, integrity, and authentica-
tion, can be identified.
Secure Cookies [71] and the protocol proposed by Yang and Rhee [94] are
server-controlled approaches to cookie protection that satisfy some of these se-
curity requirements. However, in some environments users may want to control
their own cookie security, especially if the user tracking threat is to be effectively
combated. In this chapter, two user-controlled approaches, using symmetric and
asymmetric encryption of cookies, are proposed. The main differences between
how security services are provided in the server-managed ‘Secure Cookies’ and
the user-managed approaches are summarised in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2: Comparisons of server-managed and client-managed cookies
Security Requirements User-Managed Server-Managed
Cookie Encryption Secure Cookies
User Authentication Password-based IP Address, Password, Signature
Integrity Signature, MAC Signature, MAC
Confidentiality Encryption Encryption
Replay Protection Time Stamp N/A
The ‘Secure Cookies’ approach is potentially more flexible since it offers var-
ious options to provide each security requirement. It can also be made trans-
parent to the user’s web browser. However, it is relatively complex because it
requires an additional server to generate Secure Cookies. Moreover, in most
cases, it requires a number of cookies, while in the user-managed approaches
a variety of information can be stored in a single cookie. Finally, the Secure
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Cookies scheme has the potentially major disadvantage that it prevents users
examining the contents of cookies stored in their own machine.
If a password scheme is used, the Secure Cookies method requires it to be
sent via a secure channel. On the other hand, the user-managed techniques
verify a password locally, and hence minimise its exposure. The user-managed
approaches also provide additional protection against replay, while the Secure
Cookies scheme does not.
165
Chapter 9
Conclusions and directions
for future research
Contents
9.1 Summary and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
9.2 Directions for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
The aim of this chapter is to conclude and summarise the primary contribu-
tions of this thesis (Section 9.1). In Section 9.2, suggestions for future research
are given.
9. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
9.1 Summary and conclusions
This thesis deals with security in electronic commerce transaction process-
ing. The main focus has been on methods designed to enhance the security
of SSL/TLS protected transactions made over the Internet.
As discussed in Section 3.2, there are five main security requirements for
e-commerce transaction processing, namely confidentiality, authentication, non-
repudiation, integrity and replay protection. By far the most widely used pro-
tocol to provide security for Internet transactions is SSL/TLS. However, the
analysis in Chapter 4 reveals that the protocol provides confidentiality and in-
tegrity only while the information is being transmitted. Once the information
has reached its destination, SSL/TLS offers no protection. Consequently, infor-
mation can be compromised if either end of the communications link has been
penetrated.
Moreover, SSL/TLS only obligates server authentication. Therefore, it is
possible for anyone who has access to the client’s PC to impersonate the client.
SSL/TLS also does not protect any party against repudiation. SSL/TLS does
provide partial protection against replay attacks; in particular it prevents a third
party using an intercepted SSL/TLS message. Nonetheless, it does not prevent
malicious merchants or clients from re-using a transaction.
Because of these shortcomings in the level of security provided by SSL/TLS,
four schemes for enhancing the security of e-commerce transactions have been
proposed; in each case the schemes build upon the level of security provided by
SSL/TLS. In Chapter 5, a way to use an EMV-compliant IC card to enhance
security of e-commerce transactions has been described. The scheme provides
cardholder authentication, non-repudiation, confidentiality, and integrity. The
use of ‘trusted’ card readers in conjunction with the proposed protocol is also
examined. If a trusted card reader is used, then confidentiality protection for
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the PIN is enhanced and cardholder control is gained over precisely which value
of transaction is authorised. Moreover, the fact that the software required in the
Cardholder System can be made simpler makes it easier to perform a correctness
check on such software.
In Chapter 6, two protocols have been proposed in which GSM subscriber au-
thentication and data confidentiality are utilised to enhance e-commerce trans-
action security. The two protocols provide cardholder authentication as well
as a measure of non-repudiation. The protocol which exploits the GSM data
confidentiality service also provides card details confidentiality and transaction
authorisation protection. With some minor modifications, the two protocols can
also be extended to use the 3G security features.
Even if the proposed schemes are used, threats still exist to all PCs used to
conduct Internet transactions. In Chapter 7, we discussed three major categories
of such threats, namely threats arising from active content, browser flaws, and
cookies.
Active content, especially Java applets and ActiveX controls, can pose a
number of threats to the user PC. A variety of techniques have been proposed
to control active content behaviour. However, addressing the security threats
posed by active content is not simple. While it is possible to impose more control
over active content, doing so will limit many of its useful functions.
Browsers are complex pieces of software. Discovering and patching their
vulnerabilities seems to be a continuous process. It would appear that it is
almost impossible to avoid the presence of vulnerabilities in such complex pieces
of software. The important issue is that the user must be made aware of such
threats and keep their browser updated.
Threats arising from the introduction of cookies were examined. Such threats
can be divided into three main types, namely monitoring user behaviour using
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cookies, loss of confidentiality of cookie contents, and malicious cookies. The
existence of these threats has motivated the design of two cookie encryption
protocols.
First, the main security requirements for cookies, namely confidentiality, in-
tegrity and authentication, were identified. Two user-controlled cookie protec-
tion schemes, using symmetric and asymmetric encryption of cookies, are then
proposed. The protocols have been compared with Secure Cookies, a server-
controlled approach to cookie protection proposed by Park and Sandhu [71].
The Secure Cookies scheme satisfies some of the security requirements. How-
ever, it is a server-controlled approach and in some environments users may
want to control their own cookie security. The novel protocols described in this
thesis offer such control to users.
Although the ‘Secure Cookies’ approach is potentially more flexible than
the user-controlled cookie security protocols, it is relatively complex since an
additional server is required to generate Secure Cookies. Moreover, in most
cases, it requires the generation of a number of cookies. In our approaches
however, a variety of different types of information can be stored in a single
cookie.
If a password is used to authenticate users, the Secure Cookies method
requires it to be sent via a secure channel to the web server. By contrast, the
techniques described in this thesis verify passwords locally, and hence minimise
their exposure. The user-managed approaches also provide additional protection
against replay, while the Secure Cookies scheme does not.
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9.2 Directions for future research
Many research issues remain in the area of e-commerce security, and major new
problems are likely to emerge with the growth in ubiquitous Internet access and
mobile computing. Examples of research issues requiring attention include the
following.
• Personal information processing devices, such as personal organisers and
mobile phones, are becoming increasingly common. These devices may
be used to enhance the security of Internet payments. For example, a
mobile phone could be used in place of a user PC to conduct an electronic
transaction. Whilst there are many proposed mobile commerce schemes
e.g. those using dual slot mobile phones, none of them has been widely
adopted. It is therefore interesting to investigate what the obstacles are
to their adoption and to find suitable solutions.
• It is interesting to see how biometric user authentication techniques could
be used to provide cardholder authentication. Since biometric schemes
involve comparing a measurement of some human characteristic with a
template, it is important to prevent both replay attacks and breaches of
user privacy. If biometric techniques are used to enhance the security of
e-commerce transactions, it becomes a matter of critical importance to de-
cide where certain functions are implemented. For example, where should
the comparison between the biometric measurement and the template take
place? This has an effect on where templates are stored — a critical user
privacy issue. Also, what measures are employed to ensure the ‘liveness’
of the biometric measurement? Complete solutions to these questions in
the context of current and emerging e-commerce scenarios do not appear
to be available.
• Active content is very useful and at the same time is very dangerous. As
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we have seen, existing approaches to controlling active content are not
really very useable. For one reason or another, users typically configure
their systems to accept all content or none. Code signing by itself is
clearly not the answer, since it only guarantees the origin of the code and
not its safety properties. New, more sophisticated, yet easily managed,
approaches to mobile code authorisation are required. This is certainly an
area of considerable current research interest.
In parallel with the development of new security schemes, there is a need to
further evaluate and compare existing proposals. For example, it would be of
interest to evaluate the security and efficiency of the schemes proposed in this
thesis. There are various ways in which this might be done.
One option would be to attempt a mathematical proof of security properties
of the schemes. However, this is likely to be a highly non-trivial exercise, as the
protocols involve three or more parties, and the trust relationships and protocol
objectives are far from simple. It is not clear whether any of the existing for-
malisms could capture the important security properties. A second, and rather
less ambitious option, would be to prototype the schemes. However, it is far
from clear what such an approach would achieve — prototyping would certainly
give no guarantees about the security of the schemes, and unless performed very
carefully might only provide very limited information about practicability.
In general, more fundamental research is required on appropriate methods
for testing the security of electronic payment systems. This is, of course, a very
large research area in its own right.
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